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Executive Summary
This  literature  review  provides  the  reader  with  some  insights  into  the  historic 
relationships  of  donor  partnerships  within  Ghana’s  basic  education  and  skills 
development sub-sectors. The review looks at the evolution of these partnerships over the 
years  and the various mechanisms and types  of development  assistance;  for example, 
project and programme aid, the Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) of the 1990s/2000s, and 
Multi-Donor Budget Support (MDBS), since 2003.
An  estimated  20  multilateral  and  bilateral  donors  have  been  involved  in  Ghana’s 
education sector since the reforms began in 1987. This involvement  has ranged from 
direct allocation of resources to the provision of technical services in the form of policy 
interventions  and  the  supply  of  consultancy  services,  and  of  late,  direct  budgetary 
support. The principal development partners (DPs) have included the World Bank (the 
Bank), European Union, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA),  the Danish 
International Development Agency (DANIDA), the U.K.’s Department for International 
Development  (DFID)  and,  United  States’  Agency  for  International  Development 
(USAID).  Others  are  the  African  Development  Bank  (AfDB),  United  Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). 
Donor  aid,  particularly  since  1989,  has  taken  the  form  of  infrastructure  provision, 
including  classrooms  and  books,  because  over  the  period  the  Government  of  Ghana 
(GoG) has been devoting an average of 90.0% of its education sector expenditures to 
salaries, administration, and services, leaving little for investments.  Between 1989 and 
2001, World Bank aid to the non-wage education sector ranged between 4.5% and 69.4% 
of  government  expenditure  and  averaged  33%  per  year  over  the  period.  Similarly, 
bilateral  support to the non-wage education sector ranged between 6.5% and 155.3%, 
averaging 41% per year (World Bank: 2004a: 61).
Overall,  however,  donor resources to the education sector have been characterised by 
wide swings, as shown in Table 1. The share of donor money going to primary education, 
for example, increased from 68.8% in 2003 to 72.7% in 2005 at the same time that the 
share for JSS fell precipitously from 20.2% in 2003 to about 7.0% in 2005. In absolute 
terms,  allocations  going  to  teacher  education  increased  from US$64,196  in  2003  to 
US$2.6 million in 2005. By contrast, the steep increase in donor resources for technical 
and vocational  training (TVET),  from US$64,196 in 2003 to US$1.4 million in 2004 
tapered off to US$599,809 in 2005. The adverse effects of such erratic flows in donor 
resources on recipient countries’ ability to manage both reforms and development have 
been well documented (Njeru, 2003; Rajan, et al., 2005; GoG, 2003).
The  extent  of  donor  contributions  to  the  country’s  education  sector  has  also  raised 
questions  about  national  ownership  of  education  policies.   The  GoG  and  its  DPs, 
principally the World Bank, are known to have had disagreements over various aspects of 
the reforms.  For example,  the Bank opposed the vocationalisation of the curriculum,2 
2 Since the mid-1980s diversified education had lost favour in the World Bank due partly to Bank studies 
by Psacharopoulos and Loxley (1986) and partly to the rate of return studies that showed that primary 
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contrary  to  the  wishes  of  the  Ghanaian  government  (Palmer,  2005c).  Indeed,  the 
vocationalisation element of the JSS was very much a government desire that could not 
be curbed by donors. 
In  most  instances,  however,  the flow of  donor funds to  education  was dependent  on 
Ghana fulfilling certain conditions set forth by the World Bank and IMF, sometimes for 
themselves  but mostly on behalf  of donors. The nature of the conditions varied from 
donor to donor but some conditions  are referred to as ‘performance criteria’,  and the 
others  are  called  ‘structural  benchmarks’  and  ‘prior  conditions’.  Some  of  the 
conditionalities restrain the government from making social spending and maintaining 
certain  macroeconomic  and  fiscal  targets.  Non-observance  of  some  conditionalities 
resulted in the withholding of disbursements of the aid by donors until compliance or a 
waiver was granted. Even then, the loan or grant was released in tranches, with particular 
conditionalities attached to each tranch (Alexander, 1998).
Regardless of the huge support from donors, education outcomes fell below expectation. 
There  is  mounting  evidence  that  despite  the  large  amounts  of  domestic  and  foreign 
resources that Ghana’s education sector received from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, 
there  were  few  quality  improvements  in  the  sector  (Thompson  and  Casely-Hayford, 
2007). 
In terms of partnerships, the literature review found that the closeness of the relationship 
between DPs and the GoG on the one hand, and amongst DPs on the other, has fluctuated 
since the mid-1980s. It was reasonably good during the mid-1980s to early 1990s as DPs 
were able to align support to the 1987 education reform, following the lead of the World 
Bank. During the mid-1990s to 2002 partnerships amongst DPs deteriorated and hence 
DP partnership with the GoG, while generally aligned to fCUBE, was uncoordinated. 
2003  signalled  the  start  of  a  better  partnership  with  the  GoG’s  GPRS  I  and  ESP 
documents providing a clear strategy that DPs could get behind, and closer partnership 
arrangements like the MDBS emerging.   
This  partnership,  however,  is  not  without  its  own  problems,  ranging  from  lack  of 
coordination in key programme areas to the reluctance of some donors to participate in 
some aid programmes  in  which  they do not  have  a  dominant  voice  or  position.  The 
review has also shown that despite substantial increases in donor resources for education 
reforms,  outcomes  in  the  sector  remain  much  lower  than  expected.  The  review also 
suggests a widening resource gap and inequity in financing between different sub sectors, 
populations and regions of the country.  Both the rich and the poor, male and female, 
suffer  from falling  education  outcomes  in  education.  However,  the  impact  of  donor 
partnerships  on the sector  remains  under  researched along with  the impact  of  falling 
educational standards on various groupings within the education sector.
education had the highest private returns.
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1. Introduction
 
Partnership is defined in many ways in the literature. According to Amoako (2005), it is 
an understanding between different actors expressing reciprocal  rights and obligations 
aimed at a clear goal of mutual benefit. Amoako (2005) notes that ‘partnership is a two-
way process grounded in shared liberties, duties and trust, as well as a relationship rooted 
in an agreement  that mirrors shared objectives  through a mutually agreed division of 
labour’. 
It  is  estimated  that  over  20  multilateral  and  bilateral  donors  have  been  involved  in 
Ghana’s  education  sector.  This  involvement  has  ranged  from  direct  allocation  of 
resources to the provision of technical services in the form of policy interventions and the 
supply  of  consultancy  services,  and  of  late,  direct  budgetary  support.  The  principal 
Development Partners (DPs) include the World Bank (the Bank), European Union, the 
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA),  the Danish International Development 
Agency (DANIDA), the U.K.’s Department for International Development (DFID) and, 
United States’ Agency for International Development (USAID). Others are the African 
Development Bank (AfDB), the World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF). 
Many DPs have increased their support since the Kufuor government came to power in 
2001. This support is increasingly taking the form of programme aid and sector support. 
This is notably the case for Dutch and British aid, which is 90% distributed in the form of 
budgetary programme or sector-based support particularly in the healthcare and education 
ministries (French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006). In 2007, the main DPs supporting 
the  basic  education  and skills  development  sub-sectors  were the  World Bank,  DFID, 
USAID,  JICA  and  AfDB  –  though  there  are  many  others  making  substantial 
contributions, such as the German Development Agency (GTZ) along with several other 
civil society organisations.
Traditionally, donor contributions to Ghana have come through grants and loans, project 
aid, commodity aid, technical assistance, programme aid, debt relief and budget support. 
Tangible evidence of the patterns, trends, and the amounts of specific technical assistance 
or commodity aid are hard to come by, since donor contributions in this form could be 
part of a wider package of project or programme aid, grants or loans. They could also be 
separate or tied to specific sectors such as education, health, water and sanitation, energy 
or for specific people or geographical area. In all these arrangements, donors normally 
choose  their  preferred  areas  or  sectors  and  provide  aid  on  the  basis  of  agreed 
arrangements (Tuffour, 2005). Where development assistance is provided in the form of 
direct budget support it is difficult to talk of certain amounts being allocated by the sub-
sector. Partnership arrangements or mechanisms for aid delivery have also changed over 
time (ibid.). 
The following literature review aims to provide the reader with some insight into the 
historic  relationships  of  donor partnerships  within  Ghana’s  basic  education  and skills 
development sub-sectors. The review looks at the evolution of these partnerships over the 
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years  and the various  mechanisms  and types  of  development  assistance;  for  example 
project and programme aid, the Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) of the 1990s/2000s, and 
Multi-Donor Budget Support (MDBS), since 2003.
The objectives of this literature review are:
• to identify and describe what the different partnership arrangements between the 
government  and donor-agencies  are  (and have  been  since  the  1987 education 
reforms); and, 
• to the extent that the existing literature will allow, analyse how and to what extent 
these partnership arrangements affect(ed) basic education and skills development 
outcomes in Ghana.
The first part of the review provides an overview of the financing of Ghana’s education 
sector since the 1980s.3
The main part of this review will examine the evolution of partnerships within Ghana’s 
basic education sector and the analysis is divided into three periods:
• 1987  education  reforms  to  the  mid-1990s:   this  period  was  characterised  by 
reasonable coordination among DPs, most  of whom aligned their  development 
assistance with the World Bank led support to the Government of Ghana (GoG) 
education reform process. 
• Mid-1990s  to  2002  :  as  the  World  Bank  was  joined  in  Ghana  by  other  large 
development partners (e.g. UK and USA) coordination of DP support to the GoG 
Free Compulsory Universal Basic Education (fCUBE) policy, launched in 1996, 
became more fragmented as donor competition increased. 
• 2003 to 2007: the GoG’s 2003-2015 Education Strategic Plan (ESP), launched in 
2003,  has  led  to  an  improvement  of  DP coordination  and enhanced  GoG-DP 
partnership; this is seen, for example, in new aid modalities like a SWAp and the 
multi-donor  budgetary  support  (MDBS)  mechanism.  Another  important 
development in this period is the 2004 White Paper on the education reform4 and 
its relationship with the 2003 ESP.
Annex 1 of this report summarises GoG initiatives and external agency support from the 
early 1960s onwards with regard to basic education.5 
3 A separate paper by RECOUP deals with the financing of Ghana’s education sector (Thompson and 
Casely-Hayford, 2007)
4 The reform is due to commence in the 2007-08 academic year.
5 Annex 2 provides a similar summary with regard to skills development. Similar summary tables could be 
produced for other sub-sectors of education; for example upper secondary or tertiary education. Since the 
focus of this review is basic education and skills development these tables are not included here.   
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While the focus of this review is on partnerships in education,  this review includes a 
discussion of partnerships within Ghana’s skills development sector. It outlines the main 
DPs projects and programmes within this sector and comments on the extent to which 
these arrangements impacted on Ghana’s skills development system. In particular, annex 
2 of this review summarises GoG initiatives and external agency support from the late 
1950s/ early 1960s onwards with regard to skills development. 
The review concludes that the relationship between donors and GoG over the period of 
reforms has been uneven in qualitative terms, with donors alternating between common 
funding mechanisms and separate ones.  Overall, the impact of aid on the education 
sector appears to be negligible, at best particularly given the large level of donor inflows 
from the 1980’s onwards which amount to over 3 billion US (Thompson and Casely-
Hayford, 2007).
2. Overview of the financing of Ghana’s education sector: 1980s-2000s
The financing of the education sector in Ghana has changed since 1980, both donor and 
central government financing of education has increased since 1980 (see table 1). Prior to 
the  economic  reforms  in  1984,  the  educational  sector  suffered  massive  financing 
constraints which led to a serious shortage of teachers (i.e. brain train of teachers due to 
economic  hardship)  and  teaching  materials.  For  instance,  between  1976  and  1983, 
government’s education-sector budget, as a share of GDP, declined from 6.4% to 1.4%. 
(World Bank, 2004:7). As a result, the educational system deteriorated precipitating the 
1987 educational reform. However, the gains from the economic reforms and the 1987 
educational reform led to massive inflow of both donor and government resource to the 
educational  sector.   Since  then,  donor  and  government  financing  of  education  has 
increased (Thompson and Casely-Hayford, 2007). 
According to Thompson and Casely-Hayford, 2007, ‘the need for additional resources for 
the sector has caused the government to explore other sources of financing in more recent 
years’.   These include  the  District  Assembly Common Fund (DACF) and the Ghana 
Education Trust Fund (GETFund).   DACF came into being with the 1992 Constitution 
and is financed from a constitutionally mandated 5.0% of central government revenue 
that  is  to  be  disbursed  to  district  assemblies  to  supplement  their  development 
expenditures. The law establishing the Fund recommends that 20.0% of the allocation 
(implying  1.0%  of  total  central  government  revenue)  be  invested  in  educational 
infrastructure, particularly for basic education, at the local level. The GETFund law was 
passed in 2000 and the Fund was to be financed from 20.0% of revenue from the Value 
Added Tax.  For instance, ‘of the US$1.0 billion that was spent on the education sector in 
2006, about 30.0% (US$307 million) came from non-donor and non-GoG sources, such 
as the GETFund, District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF) and internally generated 
funds (IGF)’ (Thompson and Casely-Hayford, 2007).
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Table 1:  Sources of education financing since 1999
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
GoG 350.5     342.0     385.2     472.3     525.6     541.6     586.7     706.3       
Donor 34.0       18.7       27.3       39.4       28.6       58.1       74.8       24.5         
IGF -         -         -         -         -         73.0       83.4       111.4       
GETFund -         -         -         -         62.3       75.8       86.5       125.5       
HIPC -         -         -         -         17.6       37.9       37.8       48.5         
DACF -         -         -         -         7.0         14.5       10.4       15.1         
EFA Catalytic -         -         -         -         -         -         4.2         3.0           
SIF -         -         -         -         -         -         5.7         3.7           
Total 384.6     360.7     412.5     511.7     641.2     800.9     889.5     1,038.1    
GoG-Donor Total 384.6     360.7     412.5     511.7     554.3     599.7     661.5     730.8       
Source:  GES Annual Education Sector Review Report, various issues.  Dollar conversion by AFC.
In milions of US dollars (at 2006 prices)
A 2004 World Bank review of support to basic education in Ghana states that the ‘donor 
community  has  a  massive  presence  in  Ghana’  and  that  their  support  is  ‘substantial’ 
(World Bank, 2004c: 7-8). For example, since 1989 over 90% of government expenditure 
was spent on salaries, administration and service, leaving little for investments (i.e. books 
and  buildings).6 It  is  therefore  not  surprising  that  DPs  have  played  a  large  role  in 
financing  the  non-wage  part  of  the  education  sector  spending,  particularly  capital 
investments. Between 1989 and 2001, World Bank aid to the non-wage education sector 
ranged between 4.5% and 69.4% of government expenditure and averaged 33% per year 
over  the  period.  Similarly,  bilateral  support  to  the  non-wage education  sector  ranged 
between 6.5% and 155.3%, averaging 41% per year (World Bank: 2004a: 61).
In contrast to the government’s more sector-wide view of education (as laid out in the 
2004 White Paper), development partners, particularly USAID and DFID, have tended to 
target financing programmes at  the basic education level instead of other sub-sectors. 
However, some DPs programmes supported post-basic levels in the 1990s and continue 
to do so in the 2000s. 
For example, in the 1990s the World Bank financed the Community Secondary School 
Construction (CSSP) project (1991-95) and the Tertiary Education Project (1992-98). In 
the 2000s, the main DPs supporting the post-basic level have been the AfDB (support to 
Senior Secondary Schools/ SSS for the upgrading of schools to model SSS standard); the 
World  Bank  (Education  Sector  Project,  which  has  three  components;  in  support  of 
capacity  building  in  the  main  Ministry  and  Ghana  Education  Service,  in  support  of 
implementation of the Education Strategic Plan as it relates to basic education, and in 
support of tertiary education);  and the Spanish Grant Facility (for the procurement of 
computers and other equipment for the polytechnics and the University of Development 
Studies). 
Overall,  however,  donor resources to the education sector have been characterised by 
wide  swings,  although  the  absolute  amounts  for  primary  education  have  remained 
6 The amount of the total education budget spent on personal emoluments increased from 86.5% in 2003 to 
88.1% in 2004 (GoG, 2004c: 98).  Foster and Zormelo (2002: 18) note that education costs are always 
dominated by teachers’ salaries, but Ghana is an ‘extreme’ case.  
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relatively  stable  between  US$25.0  million  and  US$28.5  million  (see  Table  2) 
Allocations to teacher education increased from US$64,196 in 2003 to US$2.6 million in 
2005, while by contrast, the steep increase in donor resources for technical and vocational 
training  (TVET),  from US$64,196 in  2003 to  US$1.4 million  in  2004 tapered off  to 
US$599,809 in 2005. The adverse effects of such erratic flows in donor resources on 
recipient countries’ ability to manage both reforms and development generally have been 
well documented (Njeru, 2003; Rajan, et al., 2005; GoG, 2003).
Table 2:  Donor financing of education by sector (in constant US$ and % shares)
Level % Share Level % Share Level % Share Level % Share
Pre-school 0.44          1.1         0.40         0.8         0.35         0.6         3.97       5.3             
Primary School 26.65        68.8       25.11       51.5       28.46       49.0       27.88     37.0           
Junior Secondary School 7.84          20.2       14.03       28.8       10.36       17.8       10.32     13.7           
Senior Secondary School -            -        -           -        0.91         1.6         17.70     23.5           
TVET 0.09          0.2         -           -        0.69         1.2         0.57       0.8             
SPED -            -        -           -        -          -        -         -            
NFED 3.61          9.3         -           -        0.15         0.3         0.63       0.8             
Teacher Education 0.09          0.2         -           -        1.00         1.7         2.82       3.8             
Tertiary -            -        9.21         18.9       16.06       27.6       9.52       12.6           
Management and Supervision -            -        -           -        0.15         0.3         -         -            
HIV-AIDS -            -        -           -        -          -        1.87       2.5             
Total 38.72        100.0     48.74       100.0     58.11       100.0     75.27     100.0         
Level % Share Level % Share Level % Share Level % Share
Pre-school 0.44          1.27       0.40         1.02       0.35         0.91       3.97       9.43           
Primary School 26.65        76.30     25.11       63.50     28.46       72.65     27.88     66.11         
Junior Secondary School 7.84          22.43     14.03       35.48     10.36       26.45     10.32     24.47         
Total 34.93        100.00   39.54       100.00   39.17       100.00   42.17     100.00       
Source:  Ghana Educatioin Service
2006
Basic-education sector only
2003 2004 2005
2003 2004 2005 2006
2.1. Aid, conditionality, partnership and outcomes
Aid  partnership  agreements  typically  set  out  terms  and  conditions  to  be  met  by  the 
parties. Agreements often allow donors to stop funding if there is a significant breakdown 
in the performance of public financial management and accountability. This is sometimes 
known as ‘fiduciary conditionality’.  They can also allow donors  to  stop funding if  a 
country  veers  significantly  from  its  poverty  reduction  objectives  or  international 
obligations.  There is general agreement that conditionality in these areas is important, 
though there is debate about the particular circumstances in which it is appropriate, given 
the potentially adverse consequences on poor people of any reduction or interruption of 
aid (Alexander, 1998).
Aid partnership has often been conditional on economic, environmental or social policies, 
such  as  macroeconomic  stabilisation  or  increased  investment  in  health  or  education. 
Sometimes it has been conditional on specific policies such as privatisation, which have 
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been  controversial  in  the  partner  country.  If  the  country  failed  to  implement  agreed 
commitments then donors have reduced or even stopped their support (Alexander, 1998).
Despite the observed shortcomings, donors  have broadened the focus of aid conditions 
from macroeconomic  policies  to  include  political  and institutional  change,  as well  as 
social and environmental policy,  such as commitment by the partner country to tackle 
corruption  or  establish  more  transparent  and  inclusive  systems  of  government. 
Additionally, donors now include conditions about the process of policy-making, such as 
the consultation of the poor and other stakeholders in the preparation of policy documents 
like the GPRS.  These ‘process conditions’, however; do not consider the content of the 
policies at stake. 
The evidence on the impact of policy conditionality in bringing about policy change is at 
best mixed. In early 2000, when Ghana conducted Poverty and Social Impact Analysis 
(PSIA) across five key development  areas,  there  has been insufficient  analysis  of the 
impact of different reforms on poor people (GoG, 2005a). In the case of Ghana, Azeem 
and Ayamdoo (2005) found that the processes involved in conducting the PSIAs were not 
participatory, and many people at the grassroots level were not involved in the study.
The 2005 DFID policy paper on aid conditionality,  Partnerships for poverty reduction: 
rethinking conditionality (DFID, 2005b), states the importance of countries pursuing their 
own path to achieving the MDGs: ‘We [DFID] believe that developing countries must be 
able  to determine their  own policies  for meeting  the Millennium Development  Goals 
(MDGs)’ (DFID, 2005b: 1).
Given  this  encouragement,  the  GoG could  well  argue  that  they  have  decided  not  to 
interpret the MDGs in the narrow sense – and focus too heavily on primary education – 
but  that  they recognise that  more investment  in post-basic  education and training  are 
essential for the MDGs to be useful beyond the mere production of people with basic-
school  education  (Akoojee  and  McGrath,  2005;  Hayman,  2005;  King,  2005;  Palmer, 
2005b; Palmer, 2005c; Palmer et al., 2007; Tilak, 2005; Wedgwood, 2005).
While  policy conditionality  does  have some adverse impacts,  part  of  the problem of 
donor intervention in the education sector has been the question of capacity.  There is 
strong evidence to suggest weak absorption of resources and inability to utilise resources 
allocated to the sector.7 The low level of implementation capacity by the MOESS itself 
has led some DPs to continue to contract their own national agencies to implement the 
programmes being executed in the country (e.g. USAID); the question of sustainability of 
the  interventions  is  very  relevant.   More  planning  within  MOESS/GES is  needed  to 
implement modalities and plan for appropriate and realistic educational goals within the 
Ghanaian context. This would ensure that capacity for implementation and programming 
is available from within the GoG to carryout programmes.
7 Based on reports from donor meetings and interviews, Casely-Hayford 2000).
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3. Developments in Ghana’s education sector since 1970s
3.1. Crisis in education: 1970s to 1980s
Ghana’s  economic  crisis  of  the  early  1980s  (see,  for  example,  Canagarajah  and 
Mazumdar,  1997)  was  paralleled  by  a  crisis  in  education  and  training.  Government 
financing for education declined sharply from 6.4% to 1.4% of GDP between 1976-1983, 
resulting in the decline of standards and quality in education (World Bank, 1996). By the 
early  1980s,  the  education  system  in  Ghana  was  facing  severe  administrative, 
performance and resource problems (Buchert, 2002; Sawyerr, 1997: 4; Yeboah, 1990). 
These  included  lack  of  trained  teachers;  lack  of  materials;  books  and  teaching  aids; 
inadequate infrastructure; poor pay for teachers; high drop-out rates; low enrolment rates; 
poor educational  management  and administration;  and a general  lack of financing for 
education.  The disruptions to the educational  strategy of Ghana – caused by repeated 
coups, the economic crisis and long spells of strikes by teachers and students – led to the 
decline  in  both  public  spending  on  education  and  academic  quality.  By  1983, 
approximately 50% of trained primary teachers had left the country (Ahadzie, 2000: 20) 
due to the deteriorating economic climate and working conditions in Ghana.8 Untrained 
teachers were employed by the government in a bid to avoid a complete disintegration of 
the education system (Konadu, 1994: 41). This objective, however, was attained at the 
expense of the quality of education as ‘pupil’ teachers were obviously ill-equipped to 
teach at levels comparable to those of their trained counterparts. By 1983 the quality of 
education had reached crisis levels and ‘it became necessary for a serious attempt to be 
made to salvage it.’9
3.2 Educational Reform Programme of 1987
In 1987, with World Bank support, an Educational Reform Programme (ERP) was started 
with the objective of improving educational quality.  The ERP placed renewed emphasis 
on vocationalising the basic education system in an attempt to re-orientate the educational 
system to better prepare youth for the world of work (Hutchful, 2002; Palmer, 2007a). 
The ERP resulted in the educational system changing from the 6-4-5-2 -3/4 version to 
6-3-3-3/4 (six years of primary, three years of JSS, three years of senior secondary and 
three or four years of tertiary). This shortened the average length of pre-tertiary education 
from  17  to  12  years  (World  Bank,  2004a:  9).10 The  1987  reforms  also  led  to 
comprehensive curriculum reforms. ‘Whereas the Middle School was a grammar school, 
in  the  JSS pre-technical  and pre-vocational  education  became universally  part  of  the 
curriculum’ (Donge, 2002: 14). 
The political environment leading up to the 1987 education reform contributed both to its 
design  and  to  the  underlying  assumptions  of  how  the  reform  would  impact  on  the 
8 The Commission for Africa report (2005) discusses the impact brain drain is having on development in 
Africa today.
9 http://www.ghana.edu.gh/past/postIndependence.html accessed on 12.05.04.
10 Six years  primary,  four  years  middle school,  five years  secondary school  and two years  sixth-form 
(6-4-5-2).  However, students who managed to pass the common entrance examination without completing 
middle school were able to complete their pre-tertiary education in a shorter period.
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economy (Palmer, 2007a). At the time of the reform, the Provisional National Defence 
Council (PNDC), a military government driven by socialist ideology that had come to 
power  through  a  coup in   December  1981,  had  made  it  their  objective  to  make  the 
education  system more  equitable  and  responsive  to  the  socio-economic  needs  of  the 
country,  particularly to reduce the high unemployment  among the youth.   Hence,  the 
PNDC was keen to vocationalise the lower secondary level in the belief that this would 
make  it  more  orientated  towards  the  world  of  work  (ibid).  Moreover,  the  increased 
attention in the 1987 reform to basic education had a political  basis:  The PNDC was 
seeking political support from rural areas – not from the minority though vocal urban 
elite.  The government felt that the reforms would provide the medium for gaining such 
support (Donge, 2002). 
The World Bank was ‘particularly influential  among the development partners’ in the 
lead up to, and in support of, the 1987 education reform (Buchert, 2002: 73). The Bank 
supported  Ghana’s  education  sector  with  two  sector  adjustment  credits  (budgetary 
support),  Education  Sector  Adjustment  Credit  (EdSAC)  I  (1986-91)  and  EdSAC  II 
(1990-94),  as  well  as  the  education  component  of  the  Health  and  Education 
Rehabilitation Project (HERP) (1986-91). EdSAC I and II were directly concerned with 
the education reforms initiated in 1987 and were largely concentrated on basic education. 
About  two-thirds  of support  under the two EdSACs was spent  on hardware,  such as 
buildings, equipment, furniture, and vehicles (World Bank, 2004a).11 Procurement was 
carried out by a newly established Project Management Unit (PMU) located in the MoE.
EdSAC I and II were negotiated in the context of the structural adjustment policies of the 
Ghanaian  government,  with  support  from the Fund and the  Bank.  EdSAC I  was  co-
financed by several donors and had features of a SWAp, a decade before the term was 
used (World Bank, 2004a; 2004d). According to Buchert (2002), a SWAp is understood 
in the Ghanaian context as follows: 
[O]ne that would further holistic development of the national education system 
and  integrate  contributions  from  all  development  partners  within  a  policy 
framework developed by the national government. It was understood as an aid 
modality  that  could  be  contrasted  with  project  assistance,  the  latter  generally 
being understood as piecemeal,  ad hoc assistance,  often contributed outside of 
national priorities. (p. 75)
The ERP was such a clearly defined, government-owned sector strategy (World Bank, 
2004a: 27). Furthermore, the understanding of a SWAp for some in Ghana necessitates 
support for the education sector budget, rather than for specific projects or programmes. 
This implies ‘that a common pool or basket of money would be made available by the 
agencies to the national government or Ministry of Education to implement a national 
programme according to prior agreement with the agencies’ (Buchert, 2002: 75). Hence, 
it can be said that the World Bank support to education through EdSaC I and II (1986-94) 
11 Educational  ‘hardware’  contrasts  to  ‘software’,  which  includes,  for  example,  in-service  training  for 
teachers, and encouraging new teaching methods. 
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and  the  budget-support  component  of  USAID’s  Primary  Education  Project  (PREP) 
(1990-95) – see below - were equivalent to SWAp for education. 
Donor cooperation in the co-financing of the ERP was largely encouraged by the World 
Bank and other  DPs (e.g.  UK’s  Overseas  Development  Administration  -  now DFID, 
UNICEF, AfDB, Norway, Switzerland, GTZ and USAID in 1990) that were willing to 
follow the Bank’s lead. This DP coordination ‘continued in the early 1990s’ and was 
‘helped by the fact that the PMU for EdSAC, which received technical assistance from 
the Bank, assumed responsibility for the management of all  external projects’ (World 
Bank, 2004a: 27).
World  Bank  critics  often  assert  that  the  Bank  indiscriminately  imposes  reform  on 
unwilling  recipients.  For  example,  Heyneman  (2003:  315)  argues  that  ‘local  policy 
makers  have  become  passive  recipients  of  the  Bank’s  agendas’.  The  World  Bank, 
however,  counters  that  the  1987  education  reforms  were  characterized  by  ‘strong 
domestic ownership’ (World Bank, 2004a: 25).12 The GoG and its DPs, principally the 
World Bank, are known to have had disagreements over various aspects of the reforms. 
For example, the Bank opposed the vocationalisation of the curriculum,13 contrary to the 
wishes  of  the  Ghanaian  government  (Palmer,  2005c).  Indeed,  the  vocationalisation 
element  of the JSS was very much a government  desire that  could not be curbed by 
donors.  The  ERP  drew  heavily  on  the  Ghanaian  1972  Dzobo  Educational  Reform 
Committee – for example the vocationalised JSS element. In the end, the Bank ‘accepted 
this  [vocationalisation]  policy  in  order  to  retain  its  position  supporting  the  education 
sector, [with its] staff saying that they saw no alternative at the time in view of the strong 
position taken by the senior MoE [Ministry of Education] official’ (World Bank, 2004a: 
25).
Harry Sawyerr, the Ghanaian Minister of Education 1993-1997, acknowledges the role of 
international donor support in helping to turn around Ghana’s education system, but with 
the GoG firmly in charge of policy, direction and donor coordination (Sawyerr, 1997). 
Nonetheless,  on certain  aspects  of the ERP,  the Bank in  particular  was able  to exert 
pressure on the government with the leverage of EdSAC I and II (Buchert, 2002). For 
example, while the Bank reluctantly accepted the government’s vocationalisation policy, 
it persuaded the government ‘to restrict vocational training at JSS level to an introduction 
to tools’ (World Bank, 2004a: 27).
A second example of Bank influence on the shape of education reform programme was 
evidenced by the Bank persuading the government not to expand secondary schools too 
quickly,  but  to  concentrate  instead  on  basic  education.  ‘The  government  wished  to 
expand senior secondary education more rapidly than the Bank thought wise’ (World 
Bank, 2004a: 25). A senior World Bank evaluation officer commented that Rawlings, the 
then Head of State of Ghana, wanted to get the donors to agree on a 50% secondary 
12 See World Bank (2004a: 25-26) for a discussion of this.
13 Since the mid-1980s diversified education had lost favour in the World Bank due partly to Bank studies 
by Psacharopoulos and Loxley (1986) and partly to the rate of return studies that showed that primary 
education had the highest private returns.
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school enrolment ratio target,  but reluctantly agreed to lower the target  after pressure 
from donors who saw 30% as a more realistic target.14
Indeed,  conditionalities  attached  to  the  EdSAC  II  included  the  requirement  that  the 
Ghana government keep its recurrent basic education budget at 62%. While this target 
was  met,  another  conditionality  attached  to  both  the  EdSACs –  that  there  should  be 
agreement on the education budget – was not always achieved. For example,  in 1990 
government overspending on tertiary and vocational education led to tensions between 
government and the Bank (World Bank: 2004a: 20, 188). 
The partnership  among DPs and between DPs and the government  was  based on all 
parties trying to cooperate with each other in the face of, sometimes, conflicting views on 
the  best  way  to  support  Ghana’s  education  sector.  An  example  of  the,  sometimes, 
conflicting views among DPs can be seen in the World Bank support to tertiary education 
in the 1990s. In contrast with other DPs, the World Bank wanted to support activities 
outside of basic education and higher education was an area which the Bank was keen to 
support in the 1990s to the tune of US$44.8 million; see,  for example, the World Bank 
Tertiary Education  Project (1992-98).  In this  regard,  the World Bank was  seen as ‘a 
traitor to EFA’ by other DPs in Ghana (e.g. DFID and USAID).15
3.3. Impact of partnership on educational outcomes of the 1987 education reforms 
From the 1980s, the flow of donor funds to education was dependent on Ghana fulfilling 
certain conditions set by the World Bank and IMF, sometimes for themselves but mostly 
on behalf of donors. The nature of the conditions varied from donor to donor but some 
conditions are referred to as ‘performance criteria’, and the others are called ‘structural 
benchmarks’ and ‘prior conditions’. Some of the conditionalities restrain the government 
from making social spending and maintaining certain macroeconomic and fiscal targets. 
Non-observance of some conditionalities resulted in the withholding of disbursements of 
aid by donors until compliance or a waiver was granted. Even then, the loan or grant was 
released in tranches, with particular conditionalities attached to each tranch (Alexander, 
1998).
Apart from the fact that there were often delays in release of funds for the sector, some 
conditionalities had serious consequences for the education sector. Pupil teachers were 
retrenched  and  for  a  very  long  time  those  vacancies  were  not  filled,  with  many 
classrooms going without teachers (Abugre and Ayine, 1999). Cuts in social spending; 
cash and carry and cost sharing in education conditionalities were harmful to families and 
led  to  chronic  under-investment  in  education,  resulting  in  reduced  enrolment,  poor 
quality outcomes, and lack of access (Ibid). For instance, before the intervention of the 
IMF in Ghana in 1983, at the basic level of the educational ladder, there were no fees for 
tuition, textbooks, learning and teaching aids, stationery and furniture. School fees were 
subsequently introduced as part of the WB/IMF policy of cost-recovery and cost-sharing, 
14 Palmer interview with senior evaluation officer in the Operations Evaluation Department of the World 
Bank (16th June, 2004, Washington). 
15 Palmer interview with senior evaluation officer in the Operations Evaluation Department of the World 
Bank (16th June, 2004, Washington).
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which was introduced into the country following the education reforms of the period 
(Abugre and Ayine, 1999). 
Regardless of the huge support from donors, education outcomes fell below expectation. 
There  is  mounting  evidence  that  despite  the  large  amounts  of  domestic  and  foreign 
resources that Ghana’s education sector received from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, 
there  were  few  quality  improvements  in  the  sector  (Thompson  and  Casely-Hayford, 
2007). This lack of improvement was noted by British Foreign Secretary, who has been 
reported as saying that ‘advances have not been uniform and poverty remains pervasive. 
We have gone forward and backward over the past  50 years’  (Ratcliffe  and Macrae, 
1999: 4). 
The  reduction  in  social  spending  (a  condition  of  the  SAPs)  meant  cutting  down 
education, health, water and sanitation. Cost sharing and other conditionalities kept the 
poor  people  away  from  school.  Logically,  those  who  attribute  the  poor  education 
outcomes to donor conditionalities may have been right. Several studies show that many 
poor households could not afford to send their kids to school, and in the process dropped 
girls from school in preference for boys (Kuyole E., C. Ayamdoo and A. Mba, 2001). 
The conditionalities attached to donor support to education in the 1980s undermined the 
effectiveness of donor aid to education in Ghana. The 1987 education sector reforms with 
the conditionalities perpetuated a partial and/or progressive diminution of the role of the 
state in the provision of basic education and other social services, which contributed to a 
fall in enrolments and low completion rates   (Ayamdoo and Ayine, 2002).  
4. Partnerships and outcomes in Ghana’s education sector: FCUBE, 
MDGs and  FTI
4.1. FCUBE: Failure of donor co-ordination and SWAp
At the  start  of  the  1990s,  following the  Education  for  All  (EFA) Conference,  donor 
support to the Ghanaian education sector largely focused on basic education. USAID, for 
example, initiated a US$35 million Primary Education Project (PREP) spanning 1990 to 
1995,  while  the  World  Bank  implemented  the  Primary  School  Development  Project 
(PSD) (1993-98).  In addition, the Bank funded the Literacy and Functional Skills Project 
(1991-95) and National Functional Literacy Project (1992-98). 
The  1992  constitution  reiterated  an  earlier  policy  on  education,  as  spelt  out  in  the 
Education  Act  of  1961,  by  introducing  Free  Compulsory  Basic  Education  (fCUBE), 
which was launched in September 1995 (GoG, 1995b). The policy for the basic education 
sub-sector was outlined in a 1996 fCUBE strategy document (GoG, 1996a) which stated 
the government’s commitment ‘to making schooling from Basic Stage 1 through 9 free 
and compulsory for all school-going-age children by the year 2005... [and] to improving 
the quality of the education services offered’ (GoG, 1996a: 1). FCUBE concentrated on 
improving  three  major  areas:  teaching  and  learning;  management;  and  access  and 
participation.
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According to Buchert (2004: 73), the strategy and action plans of fCUBE were prepared 
in ‘active cooperation’ with DPs. The fCUBE also provided a basis for a coordinated sub-
sector  programme through a  framework for  donor  support  to  basic  education  (World 
Bank, 2004d: 2). The World Bank’s supported fCUBE through a Basic Education Sector 
Improvement Programme (BESIP) (1996-02, US$ 47.9 million) (World Bank, 1996), that 
was meant  to help improve the quality of school infrastructure and foster  changes in 
school management to enhance learning outcomes (World Bank, 2004d: ix). The Bank 
intended BESIP to be part of a multi-donor support programme to fCUBE (World Bank, 
2004d: ix): 
Hence as BESIP was originally designed it was close to a SWAp (World Bank, 2003b). 
However,  ‘donor  support  did  not  materialize  in  this  form’  (World  Bank,  2004d:  2). 
Instead ‘the other  major donors (the U.S.  and U.K.) did not  join the programme but 
financed their own basic education activities’ (World Bank, 2004d: ix). The result was 
that the GoG ‘had three large donors (World Bank, U.S., and U.K.) with remarkably 
similar  projects  [BESIP, QUIPS and ESSP, respectively]  under different  management 
systems with an increase in transaction costs for government’ (World Bank, 2004d: 11). 
As a result of DPs adopting separate project structures (albeit  aligned to fCUBE), the 
original BESIP ‘design and financing plan had to be restructured and the BESIP became 
a  traditional  stand-alone  investment  project  after  the  mid-term review’  (World  Bank, 
2003b:  4).  In  addition  to  the  World  Bank’s  BESIP,  the  Government  ran  DFID’s 
Education Sector Support Project (ESSP) (1998-2005) (UK £50 million) and USAID’s 
Quality Improvements in Primary Schools (QUIPS) (1997-04) project (US $53 million 
(USAID, 2003).16
DFID’s  ESSP  provided  flexible  budget  support  for  the  GoG’s  Whole  School 
Development  Programme  (WSD)  and,  as  such,  focused  on  district  and  school  level 
interventions.17  The USAID supported QUIPS programme was designed to demonstrate 
the  conditions  required  for  effective  and  sustainable  primary  education  in  model 
“partnership schools” across Ghana. The QUIPS model dealt simultaneously with policy 
reform  and  with  school  and  community  development,  emphasizing  the  following 
objectives: (1) improving the quality of teaching and learning; (2) building capacity for 
decentralized school management; (3) increasing community involvement in schools; and 
(4)  improving  the physical  learning environment.  Project  assistance in  the amount  of 
US$51.8 million provided extensive technical assistance and training for teaching staff 
and  community  members  in  367 school  communities  (three  in  each  of  110 districts) 
(QUIPS Programme Evaluation Team, 2005).
Having three large DPs (World Bank,  DFID and USAID) with three similar  projects 
(BESIP, ESSP and QUIPS) undoubtedly led to some negative educational outcomes; for 
example it was already noted above that transaction costs for the GoG were increased and 
16 The QUIPS project selected a number of primary schools in each district for support in a broad range of 
fields: school management, improvement of teaching quality, and material support for teaching materials, 
and infrastructure (Donge, 2002: 17).
17 WSD was the GoG strategy to achieve fCUBE.
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all three projects required ‘the attention of the same limited capacity of MoE’ (World 
Bank, 2003b: 41). Another outcome of this approach was the limited capacity of districts 
to  manage and sustain three large educational  projects  at  the same time.  The QUIPS 
impact study found limited sustained change at the district and school level after five 
years  of  project  completion  (QUIPS  Programme  Evaluation,  2005).   The  QUIPS 
evaluation also found that there was a negative feeling among district officers involved in 
QUIPS since they viewed the project as having added work onto their  main program of 
work and sometimes derailing their work plans at district level.
Ratcliffe  and  Macrae  (1999:  5)  found  that  projects  funded  by  development  agencies 
‘undermine  Government  leadership,  contribute  to  policy  fragmentation,  duplicate 
approaches,  distort  spending  priorities  and  insufficiently  address  institutional 
development and sustainability issues’.  The added workload these projects demand at the 
district  and national  level  (i.e.,  competing time requirements  for workshops and poor 
collective  planning)  has  caused  some  officers  to  report  ‘donor  fatigue’  and 
disillusionment with the number of interventions at the district level.
The mid-term review for USAID’s QUIPS stated that,  ‘donor co-ordination under the 
fCUBE  has  been  characterized  as  fragmented  and  lacks  collective  consultation  on 
strategic plans and financing... [B]etween donors, there has been little regular sharing or 
coordination of the key elements of their programmes’ and ‘the lack of coordination of 
donor  activities  at  the  district  level  is  negatively  affecting  DEOs [District  Education 
Offices] operations and attitudes’ (Bonner, Bonner, du Plessis, Hartwell and Marshall, 
2001: 11, 48). The interaction of DFID’s ESSP with USAID’s QUIPS can be seen in Box 
1. 
Box 1. The interaction of QUIPS (USAID) and Whole School Development (DFID) 
QUIPS  implementation  (1997)  began  a  year  before  the  DFID-funded  Whole  School 
Development  Programme  (WSD)  got  underway  throughout  Ghana  (1998).  The  WSD 
programme (funded through DFID’s Education Sector Support Project) operated in ways that 
created  a  competition  for  attention  of  key  GES  staff,  who  were  critical  to  ensuring  the 
sustainability of QUIPS school reforms. The impact of the parallel implementation of the WSD 
programme on QUIPS implementation is difficult to measure in quantitative terms, but from an 
implementation  point  of  view,  it  should  not  be  ignored.  A few ways  in  which  the  WSD 
programme impacted QUIPS are illustrated below: 
i) Circuit supervisors and other District Education Office (DEO) staff were frequently assigned 
to carry out WSD funded work which prevented them from participating in QUIPS supported 
activities at  the district/school  level.  For example,  when the QUIPS master  teacher trainers 
came to a district for school-based training and expected that circuit supervisors and DEO staff 
would participate as co-trainers, such individuals were often working on WSD programmes. 
ii) Financial incentives provided through WSD (e.g. per diem to attend workshops, special data 
collection initiatives, etc) made it more attractive to attend to WSD work than QUIPS work and 
other general responsibilities. 
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iii) Initially, there was some confusion at the district to school level as to how to harmonize the 
resources and school-based training approaches provided by both programmes. (This issue was 
addressed and largely worked out about halfway through the life of the project when the key 
stakeholders  formalized  a  process  for  harmonizing  approaches  and  materials  developed by 
QUIPS and WSD). 
Source: QUIPS Programme Evaluation Team, 2005: 9
During the same period, the 2003 Evaluation of ESSP (1998–2003) noted the following: 
Considerable support is provided to the education sector. However… there has 
been extremely poor donor co-ordination. With few donors committed to support 
a sector wide approach, the typical project approach is cost inefficient and leads to 
duplication of efforts and systems. (GoG/DFID, 2003: section 4.9)
The fledgling structure for an education sector programme (SWAp)18 ‘appears to have 
foundered on donor competition’ (World Bank, 2004a: 28). The Bank comments that the 
spark  that  set  in  motion  donor  fragmentation  in  the  education  sector  came from the 
Overseas Development Administration (ODA), now DFID, in 1996:
The crucial episode appears to have been a workshop in London (supported by 
UK ODA) to develop a sector strategy… despite the fact that a strategy already 
existed  and that  no other  donors  were  invited  to  the  meeting.  From this  time 
onward first  DFID and then USAID went their  own way with programmes to 
finance basic education. (World Bank, 2004d: 11-12)
Indeed, from the late 1990s until 2003 - when the GoG introduced its Education Strategic 
Plan (ESP, 2003-2015) - the main donors like DFID and USAID ‘largely went their own 
way with programmes to finance basic  education’  (World Bank,  2004a:  26).  Buchert 
(2002) comments that during the 1990s ‘partnerships… deteriorated’ (p. 78) rather than 
grew.
The way fCUBE developed in practice (its design as a GoG-led national strategy whose 
initial  design  encompassed  coordinated  DP  support,  followed  by  its  implementation 
which  was anything  but  coordinated  in  practice)  has  contributed  to  a  confusion with 
regard to what exactly the SWAp is in relation to Ghana’s education sector. Sibbons and 
Seel  (2000:8)  commented  that  ‘there  is  no clear  answer  to  the  question  ‘what  is  the 
SWAp’. Despite the fact that DP support to fCUBE was uncoordinated, they did at least 
design their individual projects and programmes to support the priority areas of fCUBE 
(Buchert, 2002), which suggests a degree of coherence. To the extent that SWAps are 
concerned with DPs aligning support to national agendas, this occurred with DPs and 
fCUBE in the mid-1990s. However, Buchert (2002: 81) goes on to comment that:
There  seemed  to  be  common agreement  that  the  agencies  fully  supported  the 
framework for the government FCUBE programme, although… the framework 
18 There had been a donor coordination group for the education sector set up in 1994 and there was a 
government strategy (fCUBE); both of which are pre-conditions for an education sector programme.
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was so generally defined that any agency could pursue its own objectives and still 
be seen to work within the framework.
In spite of the lack of coordination of DP support,  the World Bank’s BESIP, DFID’s 
ESSP and USAID’s QUIPS all had some positive impact on educational outcomes. For 
example, by government agreement DFID’s ESSP was targeted at the primary sub-sector 
‘where  it  made  a  large  impact…  the  establishment  of  SMCs  [School  Management 
Committees]  and  introduction  of  School  Performance  Improvement  Plans  under  the 
Whole-School Development (WSD) programme were irreversible positive innovations’ 
(DFID, 2005a: 11). Although USAID’s QUIPS led to some improvements in educational 
outcomes, it also yielded some unexpected consequences (Box 2). 
Box 2. QUIPS: Improved educational outcomes, but some unexpected consequences
QUIPS  led  to  some  improvements  in  educational  outcomes,  but  also  some  unexpected 
consequences. These included the following: 
i) Strengthening the role of School Management Committees/ Parent Teacher Associations in 
primary education was the broadest QUIPS intervention, and because communities are far more 
stable  than  teachers  or  district  personnel,  the  impact  is  more  likely  to  last.  QUIPS  also 
strengthened the internal leadership structures in communities and encouraged communities to 
contribute and plan towards school improvement. The community focused interventions had a 
positive correlation with high performing schools and enhanced learning outcomes.
ii) Building national awareness about the responsibilities of communities to support schooling 
was one of the major accomplishments of QUIPS.
iii) While there was no direct evidence that QUIPS-financed infrastructure improvements were 
tied  to  school  performance  and  pupil  learning,  QUIPS  infrastructure  was  successful  in 
increasing  communities’  sense  of  ownership  of  their  schools  by  involving  them  in  the 
construction process.
iv) By the second year of the QUIPS intervention, pupils in QUIPS schools were able to read 
with meaning more than control schools.
v) Another outcome of the QUIPS programme was increased enrolments, particularly for girls. 
Although increased enrolments are generally viewed as favourable, the 2005 final evaluation of 
QUIPS suggested that they present systemic problems for Ghana. Reportedly, because QUIPS 
partnership  schools  quickly  developed  a  reputation  for  being  “good”  schools,  parents  in 
surrounding  communities  began  transferring  their  children  out  of  nearby  schools  and  into 
QUIPS schools. This produced an imbalance in enrolment distribution in communities adjacent 
to QUIPS schools. Enrolment in surrounding schools was depleted. 
In many QUIPS schools, the evaluation found that enrolment gains were not sustained, because 
the  basic  conditions  that  existed  during  QUIPS,  especially  staffing  and  supervision  at  the 
district level were not maintained. 
Source: QUIPS Programme Evaluation Team, 2005: xiv-xv, xvii, 2, 63
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Examples  of  where  donor  partnerships  with  Government  have  not  supported  the 
education sector are widespread but nowhere are they more visible than in the area of 
literacy  assessment,  where  the  donor  community  has  had  significant  influence  in 
developing, sustaining and disrupting assessment approaches used to test child literacy 
(Box 3).
Box 3. Aid and Learning outcomes in the 1990s:  The case of literacy assessment
Over  the  last  fifteen  years,  there  have  been  two  main  approaches  to  assessing  literacy 
attainment  among  children  at  primary  and  basic  education  levels.  These  are  the  Criterion 
Reference Test (CRT) and the Performance Monitoring Tests (PMT). The CRT was designed 
and  funded  by  USAID between  1992  and  2000,  while  the  Performance  Monitoring  Tests 
(PMT) was a  more  indigenous approach developed by MOE experts  to  testing children at 
various points in the primary education system and was fully adopted by MOESS in the late 
1990’s. When funds for these programmes stopped in 2005 due to internal and external tensions 
over the methods of assessment and the promise of a more integrated system of assessment; 
both assessment systems were no longer continued and the procedures for rigorous assessment 
was weakened. 
‘The failure of the primary schools to provide even minimum levels of learning and literacy to 
the majority of pupils represents a crisis in Ghana’s implementation of its educational reform. 
The greatest challenge for Ghana’s Basic Education policy is to reform school management and 
teaching to ensure that children do, in fact, learn. In Ghana’s case, therefore, the quality of 
education is even more important at  this point than the quantity.   Further expansion of the 
system to  take increasing  numbers  of  children  can  only be justified if  the  system itself  is 
reformed to ensure that enrolled children actually learn’ (UNICEF, 1994: 27).  
Casely-Hayford (2000) reported that the CRT results had resonating effects within the donor 
and government circles during the mid to last 1990’s. Many of the external agencies working 
towards  educational  improvement  were  disappointed  with  the  CRT results,  along with  the 
Government.  The  1995  CRT  results  provoked  alarm as  only  3.6%  of  pupils  in  P6  were 
achieving mastery in English and 5% in Maths. Strategic planning meetings between donor 
agencies became more intense and a flurry of criticisms was launched against the Government 
during the quarterly donor-government consultations (Casely-Hayford, 2000).  But despite the 
heavy influx of donor funds and concentrated attention to systemic  reform,  there was only 
slight improvement in CRT results between 1995 and 1998. Official comments from the MoE 
are straightforward in reporting the problems:
‘The need for a Ministry-led sector analysis arose from the concerns about the implementation, 
effectiveness and financing of the education reform initiated in 1987.  The reform has been 
successful in putting a new structure of education in place and increasing financing and inputs 
including infrastructure, instructional material and teacher training.  However, evidence from 
national assessments indicate that by the end of primary school the great majority of pupils are 
not functionally literate or numerate. It is now evident that while these inputs are necessary for 
the reform, they have not been sufficient to improving the learning outcomes of pupils’ (MoE, 
1995). 
The MoE recognised that the main problem was the behaviour of teachers and lack of learning 
taking place inside the schools. They, however, did not agree on the causes of these factors. A 
basic education sector review involving a study to assess the main problems and identify the 
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key areas of focus for  design and planning purposes was initiated by the MOE in the mid 
1990’s. Each donor decided to focus on a different aspect of the sector review and contracted 
external  and  internal  consultants.  USAID  conducted  research  on  issues  of  teaching  and 
learning;  DFID  conducted  research  into  finance  and  teacher  education;  the  Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA) commissioned research on girls’ education, and the 
World  Bank  conducted  studies  on  management  and  efficiency  (World  Bank,  1996;  GES/ 
UNICEF, 1995; Kraft, 1994; Kraft, 1995). Most of the studies were national in scope, leaving 
little time to consider the nature of the problems within the context of education at district and 
local level.   
The role of donor intervention in the assessment system of the Ghana Education Service is a good 
example of how donor funding can influence and sometimes derail systems which are gradually 
developing from within the country and ensuring that the capacity for sustainability is secured. 
The World Bank BESIP also had some positive impact on educational outcomes.  The 
development objective of BESIP was to improve the teaching process and learning outcomes; 
strengthen management of the basic education system; improve access to basic education; and 
ensure financial sustainability. Given the many interventions by other development partners in the 
same objectives as above and over the same period, the degree of achievements that could be 
attributed to BESIP is difficult to determine. Overall, steady improvements were made in quality. 
CRT  scores  showed  improvements  in  both  English  and  Mathematics  over  the  period  of  the 
project, both in mean scores and in the percentage of pupils attaining masterly levels. Access and 
participation also improved,  as  measured  by output  indicators  such as  GER,  Primary School 
Intake Ratio, and Share of Girl’s Enrolment. No discernible improvements were established for 
resource use efficiency (World Bank, 2003b: 21).
A 2004 evaluation  of World Bank support  to basic education in Ghana (1988-2003), 
Books, Buildings, and Learning Outcomes: An Impact Evaluation of World Bank Support 
to Basic Education in Ghana,   outlines the impact of Bank support (which has mainly 
been in the form of hardware such as books and buildings – as opposed to software) (Box 
4).
Box 4. World Bank support to basic education in Ghana (1988-2003): Inputs to outputs, 
and outputs to outcomes
A 2004 evaluation of World Bank support to basic education in Ghana (1988-2003) outlines 
both the finance and policy support that the Bank has provided to the education sector over this 
15  year  evaluation  period.  Despite  the  clear  government  ownership  of  the  1987 education 
reform  programme,  the  Bank  can  be  argued  to  have  played  an  important  role  in  its 
implementation. While critics argue that the reforms were carried out too quickly, it is at least 
as  plausible  that  delays  would  have  resulted  in  failure.  The  Bank’s  policy  conditions 
underpinned the 1987 education reforms as its finance helped them be realized, assisted by 
technical support. 
The Bank evaluation shows that  during this  15 year  period there  were substantial  gains in 
educational outputs. For example, enrolments in basic education have increased by over 10% 
compared to 15 years ago, and today less than one in twenty primary school graduates are 
illiterate, compared to nearly two-thirds 15 years ago. 
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Statistical  analysis  shows  that  these  improvements  in  learning  outcomes  are  clearly  and 
strongly linked to better welfare as measured by higher income, better nutrition, and reduced 
mortality.
The data shows that gains in educational outputs are directly linked to better school quality, 
manifested in improved infrastructure and greater availability of school supplies.
Statistical  analysis  shows that  increased school  quality can in turn be linked to the Bank’s 
support which has financed the construction of 8,000 classroom blocks and provided 35 million 
textbooks under various projects (HERP, EdSAC I & II, PSD, BESIP) over the last 15 years. 
Nationally,  the Bank supported school building and rehabilitation programmes has increased 
enrolments by around four percent. Moreover Bank support helped sustain initially unpopular 
reforms, demonstrating the efficacy of working in partnership with a government committed to 
a well-defined sectoral strategy.
Source: World Bank, 2004a: ix-xi, 25, 29
Despite the positive outcomes of the evaluative work carried out by the World Banks 
own evaluation division, other donor agencies and civil society partners within Ghana 
challenged  the  results  particularly  the  findings  related  to  linkages  between  learning 
outcomes and infrastructure development.
4.2. New approaches to education assistance:  EFA and FTI
The Education for All and its associated Fast Track Initiative (EFA/FTI) was set up in 
2002 by donors to help developing countries reach the UN’s target of getting all children 
of  school-going  age  into  primary  school  by  2015.19 The  EFA/FTI  contains  a  direct 
funding mechanism through its “catalytic fund” and seeks to ‘bridge global commitments 
and local  implementation  around a  set  of  reciprocal  obligations:  For  the  low-income 
countries  to  develop  and implement  sound education  programmes,  and for  donors  to 
support  such  programmes  with  finance  and  with  enhanced  efforts  at  harmonization, 
coordination, and acceleration.’ (UNDP, 2005: 4). 
Ghana was one of 16 countries which in June 2002 were selected by the FTI secretariat 
on a number of criteria, including the existence of a poverty reduction strategy and  a 
demonstrated upward trend in performance in primary education and domestic financing’ 
(UNDP, 2005: 4). Under the initiative, ₤500 million was to be disbursed to 16 countries, 
including  Ghana,  beginning  in  2006  (Taylor,  2005).  Indeed,  the  recent  increase  in 
primary school enrolment in Ghana is said to be partly due to the benefits of FTI and 
more recently the capitation grant.   Despite the high expectation of additional financing 
through the FTI mechanism, there remains a question currently as to whether Ghana will 
continue to benefit from FTI due to its ability to meet the basic FTI financing criteria.
4.3. Partnership in the early 2000s
19 For a critical assessment of the EFA/FTI, see Rose (2005).
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A 2004 World Bank publication notes that the effectiveness of development support to 
Ghana’s education sector had a long way to go in the early 2000s: ‘Official development 
assistance  in  education  is  substantial,  but  its  transaction  costs  are  high;  it  is  poorly 
coordinated,  rarely  leads  to  genuine  stakeholder-owned interventions,  and  has  only a 
marginal impact on the sector (World Bank, 2004c: 7).’
While support from DPs is ‘substantial’ and ‘significant’ at 8.5% of 2001 discretionary 
expenditures,  it  has  had  mixed  impact.  For  example,  the  DPs’  pledges  of  adopting 
SWAps in education have ‘not yet materialized’ and until 2003 ‘the education arena was 
marked by an accumulation of uncoordinated initiatives’ (World Bank, 2004c: 7-8).
While DP support to the 1987 education reform and to the 1996 fCUBE strategy had 
some features of an education SWAp (noted above), by the early 2000s a SWAp had still 
not fully emerged in Ghana’s education sector. This was not helped by the fact that in 
2001 there was ‘no one programme uniformly supported by all donors and there [was] a 
lack of coherence in the overall sector, with several policy documents defining education 
programmes’ (Sibbons, 2001: 12). Casely-Hayford (2002) found that a SWAp within the 
education sector in Ghana would require the following: 
• A common basket of funding and consolidated financial approach to ensuring the 
steady and timely flow of resources both domestic  and foreign  was available. 
(This is in line with the Education for All initiative, which states that any country 
able to prepare a plan for the sector, which passes a quality control mechanism, 
will be given support needed to execute its plans).
• Cohesive and cost effective plans (identifying the relevant implementers) which 
avoids any duplication of interventions.  
• Targets and mechanisms for monitoring/evaluating progress towards these simple 
targets.
• A set of mutually agreed upon benchmarks  or triggers to identify when funds 
should be released to the sector on a bi-annual basis. A regular and consolidated 
reporting system, including narrative and financial statements, to all development 
partners and government stakeholders.
• Internal and external audit systems to ensure transparency and accountability on 
funds to all the sub sectors.
Casely-Hayford (2002) found that: 
The planning and implementation modalities for a SWAp in the education sector 
do not  have to  be  complex  and elaborate.  The most  effective  plans  are  often 
simplistic and take cognisance of the limited implementation capacity at central 
and district levels.20 The SWAp should start with a modest beginning providing a 
framework  for  bottom up  planning  for  educational  development  in  the  future 
thereby empowering the districts and regional departments. More precisely this 
20 Elaborate  plans  and  costing  were  carried  out  during  the  fCUBE  reform  but  little  was  actually 
implemented since the planning did not involve all the stakeholders particularly those at the community and 
district level.
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would  mean  that  community  based  and  district  based  initiatives  could  be 
gradually integrated into the education sector planning process in order to ensure 
ownership and leadership by the people. This is in keeping with the process of 
decentralisation and development planning articulated in many of Ghana’s vision 
of development documents.
Unfortunately, this bottom up approach to education sector planning has not been fully 
achieved and has taken the MOESS several years to orient districts of the need to provide 
their  annual  plans  as  part  of the overall  educational  planning process.   The financial 
arrangements  for ensuring that district  plans are fully incorporated into the budgeting 
process and supported remains a major challenge. 
An  overarching  challenge  for  the  MoESS  today  remains  that  lack  of  harmonised 
reporting requirements and donor competition which undermines the functional capacity, 
and  ability  to  sustain  reform processes  within  the  Ministry  of  Education,  Youth  and 
Sports (MoEYS).
Donor-specific requirements drain much of the already weak MoEYS analytical 
and  planning  capacity.  DPs  compete  for  the  few  available  skilled  staff  to 
champion their own programmes. Most of the strategies and plans drafted under 
such conditions are regarded as externally imposed. (World Bank, 2004c: 8)
Aware of these issues, the MoESS took major steps to in early 2002 to better coordinate 
DP support. A DP coordinator was appointed in the MoEYS and regular DP meetings 
were held (World Bank, 2004c: 8). New mechanisms also evolved under the 2003-2015 
Education  Strategic  Plan(ESP)  (see  below)  to  address  better  coordination,  ensure 
partnership (e.g. the Education Sector Technical Advisory Committee – see below) and 
strengthen the oversight to the MoESS planning process. 
Furthermore, the move towards MDBS (starting from 2003 – see below) and the Ghana 
Partnership Strategy (including the Joint Assistance Strategy; on both see below) should 
further help to improve DP coordination.  
5.0.  Partnerships and frameworks  in Ghana’s education sector:  2003 
and beyond
5.1. The 2003-2015 Education Strategic Plan
Since 2003, the GoG has moved towards a Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp) in education 
that  attempts  to  bring  external  funding  under  one  comprehensive  education  plan,  the 
Education Strategic Plan (ESP), 2003-2015 (GoG, 2003a). 
The  ESP is  based  on  the  GPRS I  (GoG,  2003b),  the  2002 Presidential  Commission 
Report (see below), the EFA, Dakar Goals and the MDGs. It was developed with support 
from some of the DPs primarily  the DfID and UNICEF.  The ESP focus  is  on basic 
education,  but  it  also  emphasises  the  need  to  support  post-basic  education  (Palmer, 
2005b; Palmer, 2005c). The ESP has four main areas of focus (GoG, 2003a):
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1. Equitable access to education;
2. Quality of education; 
3. Educational management; 
4. Science, technology and TVET.
The ESP uses a SWAp approach with government leading the process and donors helping 
to support the overall vision and plans within the education sector (GoG, 2003a: 34). It 
notes that:
The basic education sub-sector is of great significance within the education sector. 
Ghana subscribes to the Education For All (EFA) principles… [However] it is 
important to stress… that the ESP is a whole sector plan. The Government and the 
Ministry is committed to a whole-sector development approach, i.e. a sector wide 
approach (SWAp), in which every sub-sector and every area of focus within the 
education sector is considered. (GoG, 2003a: 11)
Donor support for the ESP in Ghana represents perhaps the most extensive manifestation 
of a SWAp in the Ghanaian context to date.21 According to Volume I of the ESP, the 
SWAp allows ‘responsibility for sector planning to [rest] with government, supported by 
partnerships with the home, schools, and wider communities’ (GoG, 2003a: 4). Most DP 
funding to education has therefore been situated within the ESP framework in the form of 
a SWAp (Table 3). However, an  interesting feature of external support to education in 
Ghana ‘is that the forms of support range from projects to budget support, underscoring 
the diverse nature of what constitutes a SWAp’ (DFID, 2005a: 8). For example, while the 
World  Bank  (through  poverty  reduction  support  credits)  and  DFID (through  poverty 
reduction budget support) channel much of their funding through multi-donor budgetary 
support (since 2003 - see below), other DPs (e.g., USAID, JICA) still maintain specific 
projects. 
The  MoEYS and  the  majority  of  DP’s  remain  committed  to  the  establishment  of  a 
SWAp, ‘although in the short term, not all are expected to fully engage with the process’ 
(DFID, 2004: 3). As an interim step to establishing a pooled funding mechanism, DFID 
and the World Bank (as well as funds committed by the Netherlands, and grants from 
several  donors  under  the  EFA/FTI  via  the  Catalytic  Fund)  ‘will  share  a  common 
financing arrangement within MoEYS’ (ibid). 
21 As noted above, it can be argued that external support to the 1987 education reforms and fCUBE both 
had elements of a SWAp. 
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Table 3.  Development Partners support for Education Strategic Plan
Development 
partner / agency Forms of support to the 2003-2015 Education Strategic Plan (ESP)
DFID Support to the Education Strategic Plan (SESP); focus on improving physical facilities at the
 basic education level.
French Embassy Support for French teaching and teacher-training in schools, colleges and university.
JICA Construction of schools, classrooms and accommodation; National Computer and Science 
Resource Centre; Science, Technology and Mathematics project (STM); teacher education.
The Netherlands In partnership with DFID; probable support using SESP approach, pooling funds in the 
same Education Fund; probable support for school feeding.
USAID Education Quality for All - EQUALL Project; re-introduction of regular testing in primary 
schools; HIV/AIDS education; Safe School program; Girls' Scholarships.
European Union TA support to PBME Department of MoES; Construction of schools, teacher's quarters, 
and day care centres, under micro-projects programme)
UNESCO Teacher Training Institutions HRD; EFA National Action Plan and ESP; Community Learning 
Centres; EMIS support via UNESCO Institute for Statistics, funded by World Bank under EdSeP.
UNICEF National Capacity Enhancement; child-school community process; early psycho-social 
and intellectual stimulation; school-mapping.
WFP  Assistance to Girls' Education in the three northern regions, particularly through school 
feeding and take-home rations.
AfDB Primary Education Rehabilitation Project; Senior Secondary Education Project, including 
construction of one model school in each District.
The World Bank Education Sector Project, EdSeP, with support to the ESP through:
(A) Sector Capacity Building, particularly within MoES,
(B) Pilot Programmatic Scheme (PPS) in 40 most deprived districts,
(C) Teaching and Learning Innovation Fund (TALIF) in tertiary institutions.
Source: DFID, 2005a: 7-8
What is also clear from Table 3 is that ‘the thrust of [DP support to the education]… 
sector…  is  at  the  primary  level’  (AfDB,  2005:  15).   For  example,  the  new  DFID 
education  programme,  the  Support  to  Education  Strategic  Plan  (SESP)  (2005-2009) 
(DFID, 2004; 2005a),22 (UK £50 million), has as its goal the achievement of education 
goals under the MDGs within Ghana (DFID, 2005a). In this regard, support is targeted at 
basic education (primary and JSS levels).23  The DFID SESP is justified in economic 
terms by the potentially large benefits to Ghana of achieving UPE (DFID, 2005a).24
To oversee the ESP process, in 2004 the MoE set up the Education Sector Technical 
Advisory  Committee  (ESTAC),  along  with  thematic  groups  for  the  following  areas: 
equitable access to education; quality of education; education management; science and 
technology;  and  TVET.  The  aim of  the  committee  was  to  ‘oversee  the  work  of  the 
22 The SESP was postponed until DFID-Ghana was clear about the intentions of the GoG to follow their 
PRSP and Education Strategic Plan, both of which have a strong commitment to basic education. There is 
some concern among donors, including DFID, over the new White Paper on Educational Reforms which 
has a more ‘post-basic’ feel to it (see Palmer, 2005c: section 3.11). The SESP was therefore extended until 
late 2005 when it was expected that government policy would be clearer. 
23 The aid modality adopted by the SESP is Sector Budget Support: All funds would pass through a single 
account in the MoEYS. 
24 What is interesting, however, is that most evidence on the outcomes of education now points to declining 
returns  to  basic,  and  especially  primary,  education  in  Ghana;  returns  are  higher  for  higher  levels  of 
education (Palmer, 2007b).
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thematic groups and to take overall responsibility for advising and following through on 
the proposals of the ESP’ (GoG, 2005a: 77).
Its members were to come from the following institutions and agencies:  
• Private sector, NGOs and  CBOs;
• Denominational boards and management;
• School management committees and/or parents teacher associations;
• Ministries  of  Local  Government;  Health;  Finance  and  Economic  Planning; 
Employment and Manpower;
• Regions and districts; 
• Development partners, including external funding agencies.
Leadership of the thematic groups was as follows:
• Equitable access Director of Basic Education Division
• Quality Education Director, Inspectorate Division
• Educational Management Director, PBME
• Science, Technology, and TVET Director, TVET
By the start  of  2005, apart  from a few meetings  with DPs,  meetings  of the thematic 
groups had ‘not yet been established on a regular basis’, according to the preliminary 
education sector performance reports (GoG, 2005a). ‘This was undermining the SWAp 
process  [in  the  education  sector]  as  stakeholders  and  MoES  staff  did  not  have  the 
opportunity to discuss, through an organized forum, issues on their key areas of focus’ 
(GoG, 2005a: 5). With DPs’ assistance and the information needs required for the Annual 
Education Sector review process (AESR), efforts were made to make the thematic groups 
functional and relevant.  But problems, both in terms of commitment and representation, 
remain:  
[T]here  is  still  an  imbalance  in  the  representation  at  the  thematic  group  and 
ESTAC  meetings.  Under  the  terms  of  the  ESP,  membership  of  these  groups 
would include NGOs, CBOs, FBO, and other civil society representatives.   At 
present, this representation is limited, and effectiveness of the work of the groups 
is thus affected (GoG, 2005a: 79). 
In addition to the ESTAC, there are two other sector-coordinating structures within the 
education sector:
• the Development Partner Coordination Group - the education coordination Group 
is led by the GoG and is composed of the World Bank, DFID, EU, France, GTZ, 
JICA, ILO, UNESCO, UNICEF, and USAID.
• the Education Sector Annual Review which is a yearly review used to analyse 
progress made and district level in relation to the targets set out in the Education 
Sector Plan (ESP).
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5.2. ‘Dual-track’ policy making: Harmonising the Education Strategic Plan (ESP) 
and the White Paper on Education Reforms
Parallel to the ESP process, and one year after the change in government - in January 
2002 -25 GoG commissioned a Committee of Review of Educational Reforms in Ghana, 
chaired  by  Professor  Anamuah-Mensah.26 In  October  2002,  the  committee  issued  its 
report, Meeting the Challenges of Education in the Twenty First Century (GoG, 2002a), 
also referred to as the 2002 Presidential Commission Report. The government reviewed 
the report and issued  The White Paper on the Report of the Education Reform Review 
Committee (GoG,  2004a).27 The  White  Paper,  among  other  things,  proposed  the 
following:  
• Universal  and  compulsory  basic  education  should be extended to  include  two 
years of pre-school teaching at the kindergarten level, making basic education in 
Ghana eleven years in length (2 years KG, 6 years primary, 3 years junior high 
school);
• At the primary level fewer subjects would be taught so that ‘grounding in the 
basic skills [literacy, numeracy, problem-solving skills and creative arts]… would 
be improved’ (GoG, 2004a: 6);
• The present Junior Secondary School (JSS) system, that includes an element of 
pre-vocational and pre-technical skills training, will be discontinued. In place of 
the current JSS, will be the renamed ‘Junior High School’ (JHS), with a more 
general, comprehensive curriculum;
• Senior Secondary School will be renamed ‘Senior High School’ (SHS), extended 
from three to four years, and diversified into four streams: vocational, technical, 
agricultural and general education.
•  The government  intends  to partner  with the private  sector to  promote  formal 
apprenticeship  training  programmes,  with  government  assuming  ‘full 
responsibility’ for the first year of the programme.
Some DPs have been concerned about some of the reform proposals in the white paper 
and have made these known to the GoG. These concerns have centred on three main 
issues: (1) cost of   reforms, (2) lack of congruence between the white paper’s proposed 
reforms  and  those  of  the  ESP,28 and  (3)  assumptions  underlying  the  white  paper’s 
reforms.29 DP-GoG dialogue over the white paper reforms also touches on the congruence 
between these reforms and the ESP. While the GoG remains publicly committed to the 
implementation of the ESP, it  also appears to be very committed to the white  paper, 
which has a renewed emphasis on pre-school education, senior secondary schooling, and 
vocational training. Some DPs see the white paper reforms as ‘weakening the focus’ on 
25 It was noted above that the New Patriotic Party (NPP) came to power in January 2001. The ESP, White 
Paper, and presidential commission report were all tied to this change of government. 
26 Vice-Chancellor of the University of Education, Winneba.
27 Hereafter referred to as the ‘white paper reforms’.
28 Most of the DPs have designed their support in line with the ESP and are hence concerned about an 
apparent  shift  in  GoG  priorities,  signalled  in  the  White  Paper.  Agency  staff  and  technical  assistance 
personnel were involved in the design and preparation of the ESP, but not the White Paper.
29 For a critique of the white paper reforms, see Palmer, 2005c: 66-72.
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the ESP and as potentially shifting the focus away from primary education. This has led 
DPs to characterise the current educational policy making process in Ghana as following 
a ‘dual-track’. A 2005 internal review of education progress by one bilateral DP in Ghana 
commented on the apparent incongruence between the ESP and the white paper reforms:
There are, however, some unwelcome trends and significant risks ahead. 
There  is  an  apparent  shift  in  resource  allocation  in  favour  of  higher 
education  and  away  from  primary  education.  There  is  a  weakening 
emphasis  on  the  Education  Strategic  Plan  and  agreed  annual 
programmes  of  work  in  favour  of  proposed  reforms,  including 
vocationalisation,  which  have  great  cost  implications  and  limited 
prospects of success (Taylor,2005).
 
Nonetheless, while all the DPs in Ghana clearly have concerns over (sometimes different) 
parts of the white paper reforms, the DPs accept that this reform is something that the 
GoG is going ahead with and that they should respect the decisions made by the GoG. As 
an education advisor for a multilateral agency in Ghana noted, they have to respect the 
right of countries to reform their educational system if they feel that the current system is 
not meeting their needs or future aspirations.30 
In late 2005, the Ministry of Education and Sports (MoES) sought to spell out the white 
paper costing as well as the white paper-ESP linkage to facilitate DP-GoG discussions. It 
produced  two  documents  in  September  and  November  2005  entitled  Update  of  the 
Education  Sector  Financing  Model  to  Take Account  of  the Government  White  Paper 
Proposals,  and  Linking  the  ESP  and  White  Paper  Reforms,  respectively.  These 
documents  do  highlight  the  linkages  between  the  ESP and  the  white  paper  reforms. 
Firstly, they argue that the white paper and the ESP share a common commitment that all 
children are provided with the foundation of high quality free basic education. Secondly, 
they make the link between the ESP’s objective that ‘every sub-sector and every area of 
focus within the education sector is considered’ (GoG, 2003a: 11) and the white paper 
reforms at the second-cycle level.
While  some DPs believe that  the simultaneous implementation of the ESP and white 
paper reforms amounts to the pursuit of a ‘dual track’ in education policy making and 
reforms  in  Ghana,  the  GoG,  through  these  two documents,  appears  to  counter  these 
charges by seeking to demonstrate that they not only complement each other but in fact 
reflect domestically determined priorities for linking education to national development. 
Nonetheless, these two MoES documents make it clear that the targets for education and 
training set in the ESP have to be revised as a result of the white paper reforms31. As a 
result of the white paper reforms, the funding gap for education sector reforms increased 
to US$290 million. Since part of this funding gap is expected to be filled by donors, DPs 
30 Palmer interview with an Education Advisor of a multilateral agency in Ghana, 18.11.04, Accra.
31 For example, the projected recurrent resources required by the TVET sector in 2015 were estimated at 
1.6%. As a result of the White Paper reforms, this estimate has been revised upwards by the MOES to 
10.3%; in other words, by 2015 the MOES estimates that over 10% of the recurrent expenditure in the 
education sector will be spent on TVET. Moreover, the total funding gap for the ESP targets was some 
US$60.2 million by 2015.
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and the GoG have to  reach  agreement  over the white  paper  reforms.  In the end,  the 
preference of some DPs, such as USAID and DFID, for a  focus on primary (or basic) 
education and the GoG’s insistence on increasing investment in the SSS and TVET sub-
sectors has proven to be a source of tension between GoG-donor relations in education 
sector reform particularly over the last few years as demonstrated in the 2007 Annual 
Education Sector Review meeting.
5.3. Multi Donor Budgetary Support (MDBS) and education reforms
Since  2003,  10 bilateral  and  multilateral  donors  have  agreed  to  provide  co-ordinated 
support to Ghana’s budget, in support of the GPRS, through a Multi Donor Budgetary 
Support  (MDBS) mechanism.32 The framework allows a fixed amount  to  support  the 
GoG budget with the rest dependant on achievement of mutually agreed goals to support 
the Government’s own Poverty Reduction Plan (the GPRS). Government has agreed a 
new  Poverty Reduction Budget Support (PRBS) programme with Ghana’s DPs for the 
period  2006–2008.  Overall  DP  budget  support  is  estimated  at  US$300  million  per 
annum.33  
DFID has been a key architect of MDBS arrangements, including policy coherence and 
harmonisation  between the World Bank, European Commission,  and bilateral  donors. 
According to DFID (2005b), donors often try to bypass governments and in doing so they 
actually weaken institutions that deliver essential services like education.  On the basis of 
this  realization,  DFID  (2005b)  proposes  that  foreign  aid  be  tailored  to  suit  the 
government’s policy priorities, using governments’ budgeting and control mechanisms as 
conduits.  
MDBS represents a shift towards a new partnership paradigm and is already having some 
positive  impact  on  the  education  sector.  For  example,  MDBS  has  ‘supported  the 
government’s  programme  to  introduce  innovative  and  comprehensive  approaches  to 
education.  These  approaches  included  eliminating  fees,  providing  grants,  sponsoring 
teacher training in rural areas, delivering textbooks and transferring budgetary resources 
to districts’ (World Bank, 2007: 7) (see also Box 5).
Box 5. Benefits of Multi Donor Budget Support in Ghana  
Providing Direct Budget Support has real benefits:
32 MDBS is a mechanism that allows DPs to pool funding which is then spent directly by the GoG on 
health, education, infrastructure and more. The MDBS members are Denmark, Germany, Holland, United 
Kingdom, Canada, Switzerland and France (since 2005), alongside the World Bank/IMF, the AfDB and the 
European Union. Notably absent are the USA and Japan, which insist upon separate aid arrangements. 
33 DFID Ghana website, available through www.dfid.gov.uk
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i) Predictability of aid and donor harmonisation – budget support now accounts for about 40% 
of all aid to Ghana. MDBS allows for greater predictability for the GoG in planning its budget 
and reduces the administration involved in dealing with different donors. It provides a shared 
approach to assessing progress and a structure for discussion between Ghana and donors about 
priorities for poverty reduction and growth. 
ii) Alongside debt relief, budget support has been central in supporting the first sustained period 
of macro-economic stability creating the conditions for economic growth (about 6%). 
iii)  In  turn  macroeconomic  stability  has  supported  one  of  the  fastest  and  linear  rates  of 
headcount poverty reduction in Africa. Income poverty declined from 42% in 1999 to around 
39%  in  2005:  500,000  Ghanaians  were  lifted  out  of  poverty  during  the  GPRS  I  period 
(2003-2005) alone. 
iv) Budget support has complemented the Government’s own resource allocation for poverty 
reduction  and  been  influential  to  the  Government’s  Resource  Targeting.  Poverty  spending 
(excluding donor contributions) accounted for around 8.2% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
in 2005 (compared to 4.8% in 2002). In dollar terms this represents a 100% increase in spend 
between 2002 and 2005. This has, for example, allowed the employment of around 10,000 new 
teachers a year,  the building of  440 new classroom blocks for  basic  level  schools  and the 
removal all fees and levies on basic education (effective since the start of the 2005/06 academic 
year); this latter policy has led to a 14% increase in enrolment in the 50 most deprived districts. 
Moreover, many more poor communities in the northern and remote areas of Ghana now have 
improved access to schools.
vi) Budget support has also facilitated the timely release of the District Assembly Common 
Fund,  the  main  form of  transfer  from the centre  to  districts  which is  used for  small  scale 
development Projects, including in education and skills development. From being up to three 
quarters in arrears in 2002, the Fund has moved to being more or less current in its releases. 
vii)  Budget  support  has  strengthened the  relevance and coherence of  the  budget  process  – 
Ghana has gone from scoring one out of 16 Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) public 
financial management benchmarks to 8 in 2005. 
But support to the Government’s budget also presents risk,  for example: the threat of high 
levels of  Government  borrowing in  the  run-up to  the  2008 elections;  the weak capacity in 
Government leads to an inability to meet  the GPRS targets on time.  To mitigate these, the 
MDBS donor monitors:
i) The extent of domestic revenue used for poverty reduction programmes; 
ii) The timeliness and transparency of government financial reporting and auditing;
iii) Value for money in government spending, especially procurement; 
iv) Sound macro-economic management. 
Source: DFID Ghana site (April 2007), available at www.dfid.gov.uk; DFID, 2006
The preference of the GoG is increasingly for direct budgetary support as the GoG sees 
this  aid modality as being able  to ‘assist  education sector planning and management’ 
(GoG,  2003a:  36).  In  contrast,  the  ESP  is  strongly  against  uncoordinated  off-budget 
support; not just from DPs, but from a wide array of ‘partners’: 
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Extensive ‘off-budget’ support, through uncoordinated projects and inputs, 
whether from donors, lenders, non-public sector NGOs, CBOs, FBOs or 
the  private  sector  can  make  it  difficult  to  plan  properly  and  to  use 
resources effectively. Growth in the external support to education, while 
generally welcomed by beneficiaries when it reaches them, can place a 
heavy institutional burden on a line ministry such as MoE. A number of 
constraints can arise from lack of aid co-ordination:
• continuous visitations and numerous progress reports and reviews
• proliferation of uncoordinated projects
• duplication of effort
• parallel management units
• high administrative costs
• lack of country ownership
• cost and time overruns
• poor sustainability (ibid.)
However, the early experience some DPs have had with MDBS in Ghana (since 2003) 
has  not  all  been  positive.  For  example,  budgetary support  ‘has  shown an initial  bias 
towards the expansion of public services, rather than their quality’ (DFID, 2006: 8); in 
the case of education, this translates into an expansion of the overall number of schools 
without  the same impetus  on raising the quality  of  schooling in  Ghana.  Hence some 
MDBS development  partners  (e.g.,  DFID,  the  Dutch  and the  EC),  while  channelling 
increasing amounts of development assistance through MDBS, still maintain dedicated 
sector  support  instruments  in  education  in  parallel  to  MDBS.  This  dedicated  sector 
financing provides additional financing to the sectors that are considered DP priorities, 
for  example  improving  schooling  quality.  For  DFID this  will  be  the  case  ‘until  the 
environment  is fully conducive to the effective and sustainable development  of better 
quality public goods and services’ (DFID, 2006: 8).
5.4. Harmonization and alignment since 2005
The process of dialogue and harmonisation with regards to aid for Ghana has taken a step 
forward  since  the  signing  in  February  2005,  of  the  Ghana/partners  document. 
Harmonization and Alignment in Ghana for Aid Effectiveness (GoG/DP, 2005a) (see Box 
6). 
Box 6. Harmonization and Alignment in Ghana for Aid Effectiveness (February 2005) 
The Government of Ghana (GoG) and Development Partners DPs commit themselves to the 
following principles:
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i) Recognize Ghanaian leadership and ownership of the development process and model all 
development assistance on that premise. 
ii) Continue the development of a GPRS-based monitoring and evaluation system producing 
progressively better data which increasingly informs both GoG policy and DP allocations.
iii) Increase the predictability of aid flows, ensure the timely disbursement of resources and 
work together to strengthen public financial management.
iv) Increase the  use of country systems to deliver assistance, align assistance with Ghana’s 
planning and budget cycles and give GoG greater control over the allocation and management 
of development resources. 
v) Increasingly use the strengthened national procurement system.
vi) Continue to foster sector harmonization.
vii) Maximise complementarity and shared resources among donors to increase effectiveness 
and reduce transaction costs. 
viii) Work together to increase the sustainability and impact of capacity development. 
ix) Further develop and strengthen mutual accountability.
x) Maximise where possible the use of untied and unearmarked aid.
Source: GoG/DP, 2005a: 2
The Ghana/partners  document  (GoG/DP, 2005a) was presented in  March 2005 at  the 
Paris  meeting  of  the  OECD/DAC,34 and  then  finalised  in  the  action  plan  during  the 
working party meeting in November 2005, discussed below (GoG/DP, 2005b). 
The GoG and its DPs held a Consultative Group/ Annual Partnership Meeting (CG/APM) 
in  Accra  on  November  7-8,  2005.  The  objective  of  the  meeting  was  to  build  the 
foundation for a new Ghana Partnership Strategy (GPS) that aligns DPs’ support to the 
outcomes articulated in the GPRS II (see below). In addition to strengthening strategic 
alignment, the GPS, which is to enhance the focus on monitoring results, will support 
new ways to improve the effectiveness of the partnership, and will lay the basis for more 
predictable  funding  (GoG/DP,  2005b;  G-JAS,  2007).  The  GPS was  endorsed  at  this 
November 2005 CG/APM and updated for the CG/APM in June 2006. 
In November 2005, the GoG published its second poverty reduction plan, the Growth and 
Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS II, 2006-2009), which donors have agreed to support. 
The main pillars of this strategy are:  
• Human development and basic services (see Box 7).
• Good governance and civic responsibility 
• Agriculture and private sector competitiveness for growth. 
Box 7. Education and Training Priorities in the GPRS II
34 Since signing the Paris Declaration in March 2005, Ghana has become one of the most active players in 
the global dialogue on aid effectiveness and harmonization. Successful efforts at the national level attracted 
international  attention:  Ghana  has  become  the  vice-chair  of  the  OECD/DAC  Working  Party  on  Aid 
Effectiveness – the main international forum between donor and recipient countries on how to make aid 
more effective. In fact, the next locus of the High Level Forum in 2008, dedicated to aid, was decided to be 
Ghana (UNDP, 2006). 
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Priorities in the education sector include: increase access to and participation in education and 
training at all levels; bridge gender gaps in access to education in all districts;  improve the 
quality  of  teaching  and  learning;  improve  efficiency in  the  delivery of  education  services; 
promote science and technology education at all levels with particular attention to increased 
participation of girls.
Training,  skills  and entrepreneurial  development  will  be guided by the following priorities: 
provision of skills and entrepreneurial training in a gender responsive and equitable manner; 
promotion of dialogue between industry and skills/professional training institutions to produce 
skilled  labour  required  by  industry;  strengthening  of  and  support  human  resource  training 
institutions; promotion of training in apprenticeship; promotion of the adoption of the National 
Youth Policy and enactment of the Disability Bill.
Source: GoG, 2005b: xxvi
In  February  2007,  the  Ghana  Joint  Assistance  Strategy  (G-JAS)  (G-JAS,  2007)  was 
published, a strategy that emerged from the GPS agreements in 2005 and 2006. The G-
JAS is a DP initiative aimed at improving the alignment of development assistance with 
the core business of Government and the Government’s political and partnership cycle. It 
builds on commitments by DPs to work toward the achievement of goals and priorities of 
the GPRS II and to accelerate progress against mutually defined harmonization principles 
(G-JAS, 2007).
The G-JAS involves the majority of Ghana’s GPS development partners (representing 
about 95% of ODA flows).35  The time frame for the G-JAS is four years, starting in 2007 
and ending in 2010 (Box 8).
Box 8. Expected achievements by the end of the G-JAS period (2007-2010)
i) higher quality dialogue between DPs and the government;
ii) improved aid delivery through a better division of labour and a solid process for
deciding who does what;
iii) greater harmonisation in the way development assistance is delivered;
iv) increased reliance on programme based modalities and coordinated technical
assistance programmes that support government priorities;
v) improved predictability in resource flows and reduced transactions costs for
government; and
vi) better alignment of DP country strategies and resource allocations with GPRS II
goals and priorities.
Source: G-JAS, 2007: 2
With regard to education, the G-JAS partners are focussed on the achievement on the 
MDGs (Box 9) and aligned in support of the GoG priorities (see annex 3 and 4).
Box 9. Expected focus of G-JAS partners’ assistance to education during 2007-2010
35 G-JAS partners  include:  Canada,  Denmark,  EC,  France,  Germany,  Japan,  Italy,  Netherlands,  Spain, 
Switzerland, UK, USA, AfDB, IFAD, UN and the World Bank.
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In support of improved educational outcomes and accelerated achievement of the MDGs, the 
G-JAS partners will  focus on increasing access,  completion and quality in basic education, 
particularly the six-year cycle of primary schooling, and specific measures, such as incentive 
schemes,  to  increase  girls’  enrolment,  retention  and  completion,  particularly  in  secondary 
education. G-JAS partners will work with the Ministries of Education and Finance to improve 
efficiency and equity in education financing at  all  levels,  particularly in  pursuit  of  a  more 
sustainable and equitable system of funding for tertiary education. Partners are working with 
government to develop a SWAp within which support will be provided.
Source: G-JAS, 2007: 30
In  support  of  Government’s  overall development  strategy,  DPs  committed  to  make 
available US $1.2 billion in 2006, the first year of the GPRS II (GOG/DP, 2005b); total 
projected  disbursements  for  the  2007-2010 period is  estimated  at  over  US$ 5 billion 
(Table 4). 
 Table 4.  Prospective G-JAS Financial Flows: 2007-2010
Total Projected Disbursement (US$ mn)
Aid instruments / 2007 2008 2009 2010 2007-
GPRS II sector 2010
Total Projected Disbursements 1,292.7 1,382.9 1,434.7 1,255.0 5,365.3
of which:
Budget Support (MDBS) 293.6 354.6 378.1 361.2 1,387.5
Direct Support to Civil Society 16.8 16.1 12.9 11.9 57.7
Sector and Investment Support 982.3 1,012.2 1,043.7 881.9 3,920.1
of which:
Education 99.2 110.2 103.5 98.0 411.9
Source: G-JAS, 2007: 28
5.5. A broader view of partnership and involving the civil society sector
While ‘partnership’ in this review has largely focused on DP-GoG interaction, the term 
includes not only the relations between the state and donors but also the private sector 
and civil society, broadly, including NGOs. Support to the education sector by NGOs has 
been  diverse.  They  have  concentrated  largely  on  capacity  building,  infrastructure 
development and direct sponsorship to children particularly girls. One of the other areas 
where CSO’s have been active is in the field of complementary education whereby they 
provide accelerated educational programs which help children attain basic literacy within 
a shorter period and more flexible time for poor children36 (Casely-Hayford and Ghartey, 
2007). Other NGO’s provide funds for the construction of classrooms and training of 
teachers; food rations, as well as lunches (Box 10).
Box 10. NGO support to Ghana’s education sector and outcomes 
36 Over 80,000 children have been reached by the School for Life Literacy program in northern Ghana since 
1995.  A recent Impact assessment of their work suggests that the program is extremely effective 
particularly in hard to reach areas where trained teachers refuse postings (Casely-Hayford and Ghartey, 
2007).
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‘Possibly the most successful support provided by development partners for children in school 
in deprived areas has been school feeding programmes. Catholic Relief Services (CRS) covers 
approximately 90% of schools in rural schools in the three northern regions. CRS conducted a 
methodologically rigorous impact assessment of its school feeding programme, and found that 
school feeding could account for 26% of the increase in gross enrolments from 1996 to 2000. 
Moreover, the increased attendance rate of girls overall and relative to boys could be attributed 
to the ‘take-home ration’ targeted at girls’ (GoG/DFID, 2003: section 4.9).
‘Various reports suggest that non-formal initiatives which support out-of-school children (for 
instance,  Action  Aid’s  Shepherd  Schools  and  School  for  Life)  are  effective  in  educating 
children, and possibly more cost effective than formal education particularly in remote rural 
areas of Ghana (GoG/DFID, 2003: section 4.9).
However,  it  has  been  noted  that  much  of  the  support  from  the  NGO  sector  has  been 
uncoordinated,  leading to a number  of  problems,  including proliferation and duplication of 
programmes and projects; parallel management units; as well as lack of national ownership. 
Also, successful programmes piloted by NGOs do not come to the attention of the MoES and, 
therefore, the lessons learned from such pilots are not available for evaluation and other studies 
in the education sector (GoG, 2005a). 
One of the greatest challenges in the education sector is the relationship between the civil 
society sector and the Ministry of Education.  Several opportunities have arisen over the 
last fifteen years where the CSO sector could have helped to implement various piloted 
projects which were ready for scale in order to enhance educational  development  but 
agreement over the approach for collaboration could not be reached.37    The Multi donor 
budgetary support  mechanisms have also weakened civil  societies  sector’s  bargaining 
power and ultimately their ability to work for the Ministry since funding is channelled 
directly to Government.  The MDBS has not been designed to utilise the full potential of 
civil society (ODI, 2007).  This review has revealed that while a large focus of donors 
and  government  has  been  to  optimise  the  coordination,  financial  mechanisms  and 
restructuring  within  the  education  sector,  the  civil  society  sector  has  not  been  fully 
involved nor incorporated within these processes.  
There has been some level of acknowledgement by the MOESS of the potential of civil 
society  to  contribute  to  educational  development  particularly  in  deprived  rural  areas. 
Systematic and concerted efforts made over the last two years through the efforts of two 
major  NGO  coalitions  (the  Ghana  National  Education  Coalition  Campaign  and  the 
Northern Network for Education and Development) are helping to increase the voice of 
the civil society sector particularly in relation to their appraisal of issues proceeding the 
Annual Education Sector Reviews and equity issues across Ghana (Casely-Hayford and 
Ghartey, 2007).  The MOESS is also realising that the NGO sector may be able to play a 
vital role in providing basic education to deprived areas and meeting some of the EFA 
goals through the complementary education efforts being implemented through NGO’s 
such as School for Life.   A complementary education policy document has just been 
37  The World Bank Schooling Improvement Fund (SIF) and the World University Service of Canada Girls 
Education Program are two examples to date.
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completed by the MOESS with inputs from civil  society and is the first step towards 
bridging the gaps which exist between state and non state providers of education.
6.  Partnerships and outcomes in Ghana’s skills development sector
 
This section focuses on skills development, but starts with a word on DP involvement in 
formal post-basic education.  Since 1990 and the Education for All Conference, some 
DPs have funded areas other than basic education, with the World Bank being the largest 
supporter of post-basic  education in Ghana.  Between 1991 and 1998, two investment 
projects  complemented  the  two  EdSACs,  namely  the  Community  Secondary  School 
Construction (CSSP) project (1991-95) and the Tertiary Education Project (1992-98). In 
2004 the World Bank launched its Education Sector Project (EdSeP), which is planned to 
run from May 2004 – October  2009 (see World Bank, 2004c).  There are  three main 
components of the EdSeP:
• Sector  Management  Capacity  Building:  To  build  capacity  at  all  levels  of  the 
educational system between and within organizations in the sector; improve the 
quality of leadership and management in the sector
• Pilot Programme Scheme – applies to basic education.
• Tertiary Education Innovation – applies to tertiary education.
The EdSeP ‘seeks to promote efficiency, equity, and quality at all levels of the education 
system and to boost access at the basic level and relevance at the tertiary level’ (World 
Bank,  2004c:  3).  However,  any  explicit  targeting  of  Senior  Secondary  education  is 
notable  by  its  absence.  The  origins  of  EdSeP  also  reveal  something  of  the  donor-
government interaction. In 2000 the Ghanaian government sought the Bank’s support to 
solely ‘initiate the recovery of tertiary education’ (World Bank, 2004c: 20). However, as 
the Bank prepared to respond a common view was developed that weak management at 
all levels of the sector would undermine any attempt to improve the situation, and that 
any new operation would need to address the issue of overall sector management to be 
successful. Consequently, the concept of a project exclusively devoted to a single sub-
sector was dropped (World Bank, 2004c: 20). 
Technical and vocational skills development (including TVET) has been an area where 
the GoG has consistently, and repeatedly, reiterated its desire to develop further – as the 
sector was seen as one of the solutions to the unemployed school-leaver problem (Palmer, 
2005a; Palmer, 2007a). In spite of this, TVET in Ghana has received little actual support 
from DPs or government (Palmer, 2007a; World Bank, 2004b). This is due, among other 
things, to a lack of demand for TVET, few opportunities for TVET graduates, and the 
GoG not learning from its past attempts at promoting TVET (Palmer, 2007a). In 2005 the 
estimated total expenditure on TVET (in the MoE) was 1.4% of total education spending 
(GoG, 2005a). In 2002 the MoMYE allocated 12% of its  budget to the TVET sector 
(GoG, 2002: 12). Donor spending on TVET in 2005 was estimated at just 0.9% of total 
donor spending in the education sector. 
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Despite  this,  there  have  been  a  number  of  DPs  engaged  in  various  TVET-related 
programmes in Ghana38, including: (i) the World Bank Vocational Skills and Informal 
Sector  support  project  (VSP)  (1995-01;  (ii)  DFID  (NVTI  Centres  Support  Project, 
1996-1998); (iii) UNICEF (support to establishing the Integrated Community Centres for 
Employable Skills (ICCES), 1987-1992); (iv) JICA (support to development of TVET 
policy  framework;  other  small-scale  support  to  ICCES;  new  Technical  Vocational 
Education and Training Support (TVETS) Project,  to commence 2006); (v) GTZ (e.g. 
support  to  Takoradi  Technical  Institute,  1977-2005);  (vi)  Netherlands  (support  to  20 
VOTEC Resource Centres in some TVET institutions (1999-2003) and, in 2006, support 
to the new Ghana Industrial  Skills Development Centre at Tema; (vii) NGOs39 small-
scale support to ICCES (1986-2006).
Annex 2 of this review summarises GoG initiatives and external agency support from the 
late  1950s/  early  1960s  onwards  with  regard  to  skills  development.  What  Annex  2 
highlights  is that,  for the most  case,  DP support has consisted of a series of specific 
projects without any overall framework for coordination.
While,  in  many  cases,  this  support  has  improved  the  quality  in  individual  training 
institutions, it has not had an impact on the national TVET system (JICA/GoG, 2005: 22) 
–  partly because that  support  has  targeted  individual  beneficiary institutions  and also 
because TVET is spread across numerous different ministries. According to JICA, the 
TVET system in Ghana is so fragmented and spread across so many different ministries 
and agencies that ‘not even the government have [sic] a full-clear picture of the situation’ 
(GoJ, 2004: 3).
In fact, since the late-1990s, JICA has been assisting the GoG in the development of a 
TVET policy framework. In 2004, the GoG produced a draft framework (GoG, 2004b), 
though this has been some eight years in the making. The Government has recently (July 
2006) passed into law the Council for TVET (COTVET) Bill, which will bring COTVET 
into existence; a body intended to replace the weak NACVET to coordinate TVET policy 
in  Ghana  (see  Palmer,  2007a  for  a  discussion  on  these  developments).  JICA’s 
involvement in the development of the TVET Policy Framework is an important example 
of donor involvement in the policy planning frameworks of the GoG.
7.  Conclusions  
38 This section on donor support to TVET draws on Palmer (2007a).
39 Included among these non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are faith-based organisations (FBOs) and 
community-based  organisations  (CBOs).  There  are  also  numerous  types  of  NGOs  engaged  in  TVET 
support,  varying from non-profit  NGOs, to business-NGOs (BUNGOs),  quasi-NGOs (QUANGOs) and 
political-NGOs (PONGOs). 
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Current primary school enrolment  is increasing faster  than the school-age population. 
Enrolment  ratios  are  increasing,  but  progress  towards  Universal  Primary  Education 
(UPE) has been steady rather than rapid. Ghana is judged to be on track to achieve MDG 
2 (UPE) by 2015 and has made good progress in reducing poverty (Box 11).  
Box 11. Ghana’s MDG progress in poverty reduction and education
Government has made very good progress in reducing headcount poverty nationwide and in 
the  three  poorest  Northern  regions,  where  access  to  basic  social  services  has  improved 
significantly, albeit from a low base. Nationally, poverty has fallen from 52% in 1992 to 42% 
in 1997 to 35% in 2003. Ghana’s income poverty gap is small compared with other developing 
countries.
Government has made reasonable progress against the education MDGs in the absence – until 
recently  -  of  sustained  and  concerted  policy  engagement  and  funding  from donors.  Gross 
primary  enrolment  rose  by  7% between  1999  and  2004  to  over  86%,  but  these  statistics 
discount the recent positive impacts of the capitation grants scheme. The primary completion 
rate rose by over 5% between 2003 and 2004 to around 78%.
Net Primary school enrolment (MDG 2) rose from 79.5% in 1999 to 92.1% in 2005 (Ghana 
Ministry of Education Stats). This rise has happened while maintaining broadly equal numbers 
of boys and girls (MDG 3). For every 100 boys there are 94 girls.
Source: DFID, 2006: 15; DFID, 2007; World Bank, 2007
However, there are still more than one million primary school-age children not enrolled 
at  the  primary  level,  and  developments  at  the  post-basic  level  (e.g.  the  post-basic 
elements of the 2004 White Paper) might threaten UPE. In the last few years, secondary 
and tertiary enrolments have increased dramatically and the recurrent cost implications 
could mean a reduction in support to basic education.  The main challenge within the 
Ghanaian education sector  remains  the question of quality particularly at  the primary 
level where very few children who do attend school become literate and learn. 
A  broader  view  of  partnership  is  needed  within  the  education  sector,  one  which 
incorporates the full involvement of civil society as potential agents of change ensuring 
that  they  are  recognised  as  supporters  and  transformative  agents  of  the  state  sector 
helping  to  achieve  the  MDG  and  EFA  goals.  Several  policy  frameworks  developed 
within Ghana’s education sector has increased the complexity of relations between state 
and non state actors involved in the education sector; this complexity may hamper the 
ability of the state to fulfil district, national and international targets.  
The new white paper reforms diverges remarkably from the existing educational policy 
framework,  the  ESP,  and  largely  advocates  an  increased  focus  on  the  post-basic 
education and skills  training levels.  Hence,  tensions exist  over education and training 
priorities between donor agencies (who have their sights on international targets set by 
the  MDGs)  and  government  (which  appears  to  want  to  focus  more  on  post-basic 
education and training). This has the potential of creating problems for donor assistance, 
including  donors  potentially  withholding  financing  for  education  and  the  problems 
43
arising from the Multi-Donor Budget Support  (MDBS) and the FTI mechanisms.  For 
example,  donors  might  be  encouraged  to  add  more  ‘disbursement  triggers’ 
(conditionalities) to budget assistance, or to question the effectiveness of Direct Budget 
Support (DBS). Given the fungibility of aid under the MDBS, the GoG would likely be 
able  to  pursue  its  own  education  objectives  (e.g.,  expanding  post-basic  education) 
regardless of many DPs’ wishes for a focus on basic/primary education.   
This literature review demonstrates that the closeness of the partnership between DPs and 
the GoG on the one hand, and the partnership amongst DPs on the other, has fluctuated 
since the mid-1980s. It was reasonably good during the mid-1980s to early 1990s as DPs 
were able to align support to the 1987 education reform, following the lead of the World 
Bank. During the mid-1990s to 2002 partnerships amongst DPs deteriorated and hence 
DP partnership with the GoG, while generally aligned to fCUBE, was uncoordinated. 
2003  signalled  the  start  of  a  better  partnership  with  the  GoG’s  GPRS  I  and  ESP 
documents providing a clear strategy that DPs could get behind, and closer partnership 
arrangements like the MDBS emerging.   
This  partnership,  however,  is  not  without  its  own  problems,  ranging  from  lack  of 
coordination  and agreement  in  key programme  areas  such as  assessment  approaches, 
reporting formats and quality improvement programmes to the reluctance of some donors 
to participate in some aid programmes in which they do not have a dominant voice or 
position. The review has also shown that despite substantial increases in donor resources 
for  education  reforms,  system wide  outcomes  in  the  sector  remain  much  lower  than 
expected. The review also suggests a widening resource gap and inequities in financing 
between different sub sectors, populations and regions of the country. Both the rich and 
the  poor,  male  and  female,  suffer  from  falling  education  outcomes  in  education. 
However, the impact of donor partnerships on the sector remains under researched along 
with the impact of poor educational standards on various grouping within the education 
sector. 
Given this mixed record of aid and educational outcomes, there appears to be a need to 
study,  and  propose  alternative  methods  for  enhancing  aid  effectiveness  particularly 
within specific sub-sectors such as primary and basic education in order to ensure that the 
MDGs are met. It also suggests that a broader definition of partnership be considered 
which  fully  encompasses  non state  civil  society  actors  in  the  process  of  educational 
development and improvement programmes. Some of the research questions which need 
further investigation in Ghana are: 
• What  is  the  impact  of  the poor  education  outcomes  on children  from various 
poverty quintiles, across the regions of Ghana and across diverse socio economic 
contexts? Who has benefited and who has gained? 
• What has been the responsibility of development partners, if any, in the failure to 
reform the basic education, gender equity and training sector? 
• Can  the  people  of  Ghana  hold  the  Government  and  DPs  accountable  for  the 
failures?
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• How have inequities within educational expenditure and outcomes been addressed 
and monitored? 
• Given the fungibility of aid under the MDBS, to what extent can the GoG pursue 
its own education objectives (e.g., expanding post-basic education) regardless of 
many DPs’ wishes for a focus on basic/primary education?  
• What impact does the relationship between government (state) and civil society 
(non state) have on the education sector? 
• How have changing aid modalities and partnership arrangements impacted on the 
educational outcomes of the poor?
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Annex 1:  Government Initiatives and External Agency Support in Basic Education 
since the 1960s
Government initiatives related to Basic Education External  agency  and  development  partner  initiatives 
(focus on the main agencies: World Bank, DFID, USAID) 
in support of Basic Education40
1960  Education  Act (87)  -  making  primary 
schooling  compulsory  and  free  with  effect  from 
September  1961 -  although it  does not define until 
what age the child should attend school. Established 
private institutions.
Enrolment doubled in five years  and Ghana gained 
recognition for having the most developed Education 
system in Africa.
Before the 1987 Education Reform Programme (see below), 
there  was  some  support  from  external  agencies  and 
development  partners  to  basic  education;  e.g.  UNICEF 
(support  to  experimental  junior  secondary  schools);  the 
World Bank (who provided some support to social services, 
including  education);  and  Japan  through  the  Japanese 
Overseas  Cooperation  Volunteers  (JOCV)  since  1977 
(however, about 60% of JOCV go to SSS and a further 20% 
to VTIs).
1966-81 Period of successive political coups
Educational  restructuring  was  conceived  but  not 
implemented.
Declining quality due to economic decline and large 
number of trained teachers are lost to out-migration.
1983:  IMF/World  Bank  Structural  adjustment  programme 
(SAP) adopted by Ghana.
1986:  Project  Management  Unit (PMU), located in 
the  MoE,  set  up  to  procure  items  for  both  World 
Bank  EdSACs  (see  right).  The  PMU  assumed 
responsibility  for  the  management  of  all  external 
projects  at  this  time;  e.g.  the  budget  support 
component  of  USAID’s  PREP  (see  right)  went 
through  the  PMU.  The  PMU  (was  later  renamed 
‘Funding and Procurement Management Unit’) was 
responsible for technical aspects of procurement and 
disbursements  (for  the  World  Bank,  AfDB  and 
KfW);  other  agencies  (e.g.  DFID  from  1998,  and 
USAID after PREP) managed their own funding. 
1987:  Education Reform Programme initiated - total 
restructuring of Basic Education system.
1992:  Constitution –  introduced  Free  Compulsory 
Universal  Basic  Education  (fCUBE),  set  to  be  a 
constitutional obligation by 2005.
1993: GoG embarked on fCUBE which began to be 
operationalised in 1996. FCUBE aimed at  a  sector 
wide,  comprehensive  change  to  improve  teaching 
and  learning  outcomes,  efficiency  in  management, 
and  increased  access  and  participation  through 
enhanced community participation.
1993:  District  Assemblies  Common Fund  (DACF) 
1987:  Education Reform Programme heavily funded by the 
World Bank (see below).
1986-91:  World Bank Health and Education Rehabilitation 
Project;  education  component  was  US$  6.1  million  to 
primary  school  text  books;  US$  13.1  million  support  to 
stationary (exercise books,  pens etc),  though not all  to the 
basic education level.
1986-94:  World  Bank  Education  Structural  Adjustment 
Credits  (EdSAC)  linked  to  the  Education  Reform 
Programme; EdSAC I (1986-91, US$ 38.3 million), EdSAC 
II  (1990-94,  US$  53.2  million)  –  budget  support  with 
conditionalities for release of funding. 
1990:   World  Conference  on  Education  for  All,  Jomtien, 
Thailand.  Signals  a  shift  in  external  agency  support  to 
prioritise basic, especially primary, education.
1990-05:  USAID  Primary  Education  Programme  (PREP) 
(US$  35  million)  –  90%  of  funding  was  budget  support. 
Focus  on  software  (e.g.  teacher  training  and  national 
assessment),  but  about  30%  of  funding  allocated  to 
textbooks. 
1990 – ongoing: EU micro-projects programme (EU MPP); a 
district  allocated fund with about 30% of all  micro-project 
funding used for educational projects  - mainly support for 
40 These  are  not  the  only  external  agency  and  development  partner  initiatives  concerned  with  basic 
education, but the main ones (others included in this table are JICA, UNICEF, EU). For example, there has 
also been assistance to the basic education sector over this period from a large number of NGOs.
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set up as a statutory budget item (paid for from 5% 
of  central  government  revenue)  of  which  20%  is 
recommended for education infrastructure.
1994: Education Reform Review Committee set up 
to  revise  academic  programmes  under  the  reform 
programme at basic and secondary levels in order to 
enhance quality and performance.
school block construction (about  US$ 7.5 million used for 
educational  projects,  with  about  1,500  school  blocks 
constructed by 2004).
1992-97: World Bank Literacy and Functional Skills Project 
(US$ 27.8 million).
1992-04:  World  Bank  National  Functional  Literacy 
Programme (US$ 23.7 million).
1993-98:  World Bank Primary School Development (PSD) 
Project  –  objective  to  increase  learning  achievements  and 
enrolments in primary schools. About 85% of funds spent on 
educational  infrastructure  (e.g.  classroom  blocks,  head 
teacher’s  bungalow).  The  project  was  restructured  at  the 
mid-term review to better support the fCUBE (see below); 
but changes made little difference to the allocation of funds 
(with most still spent on hardware).
1995 UNICEF Ghana: National Programme of Action for the 
Survival, Protection and Development of Children.
1996 (July):  Free  Compulsory  Universal  Basic 
Education  (fCUBE)  programme  operationalised. 
Whole  School  Development  (WSD)  programme 
launched - the MoE/GES classroom-focussed basic-
education  strategy  for  achieving  the  fCUBE 
objectives.  FCUBE  secretariat  set  up  in  GES  to 
coordinate (support to) the fCUBE programme.
1997:  GoG  funding  agency  consultative  panel 
established  to  improve  GoG-agency  collaboration. 
Met twice a year.
1998:  FCUBE secretariat  largely  disbanded  due  to 
lack  of  efficiency.  Replaced  by  a  Development 
Partners coordinator in March 1999. 
1996:  Mid-term Review of progress in EFA.
Sector wide fCUBE programme launched.
1996-02: World Bank Basic Education Sector Improvement 
Project (BESIP) (US$ 47.9 million) – intended to support the 
government’s  policy  of  fCUBE. Despite  Bank 
acknowledgement that ‘more attention has
to be paid to software’, most (c.77%) Bank resources for the 
project were devoted to hardware and instructional materials.
1997-04: USAID Quality Improvements in Primary Schools 
(QUIPS) (US$ 51.8 million) – 26% of funding was budget 
support;  74%  was  allocated  to  the  improvement  of  367 
schools. Intended to support the GoG fCUBE programme.
1998-05:  DFID  Education  Sector  Support  Project  (ESSP) 
(UK£50  million).  Focus  on  basic  education  in  support  of 
fCUBE.  Using a sub-sector budget support approach, ESSP 
funds  were  disbursed  via  the  Ghana  Education  Service 
(GES) in support of the Whole School Development (WSD) 
programme  and  focused  on  district  and  school  level 
interventions.
DFID begins support to the sector with ESSP (1998 -above) 
but other donors continue financing through project  driven 
mechanisms (e.g. USAID QUIPS in 1997).
1999: National Education Forum led to the creation 
of  the  Development  Partner  Co-ordination  Unit  of 
the MoEYS meant to co-ordinate the activities of all 
the Development Partners supporting the Education 
Sector.
1999: Education Sector Strategic Plan (1999-2001)
2000:  Millennium Development Goals – education goal  of 
UPE  maintains  external  agency  prioritisation  for  basic, 
especially primary, education. 
2001: NPP government decided to apply for debt relief
under the enhanced IMF–World Bank Heavily Indebted Poor 
Country (HIPC) initiative
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Education Sector Review supported by UNICEF, the 
World Bank and DfID.
2000: Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-
PRSP) 
2001: New Patriotic Party (NPP) wins election
2001: GETFund set up (a statutory budget paid for 
from 2.5 percentage points of the 12.5% VAT) - but 
most  (up  to  90%)  of  funding  goes  to  tertiary 
education. 
2002:  Presidential  Committee  of  Review  of 
Education Reforms. 
2003: Education Strategic Plan (2003-15) provides a 
sector-wide  approach  (SWAp)  framework  for  all 
donors  to  support  the  sector.  The  ESP provides  a 
clear  policy  framework  and  indicative  practical 
measures  designed  to  achieve  the  six  EFA  Dakar 
goals  and  the  two  education  MDGs. The  ESP 
prioritises  the  basic  education  service  delivery 
components of the GPRS.
2003-2005:  Ghana  Poverty  Reduction  Strategy 
(GPRS I). 
2004: Ghana joins the EFA Fast Track Initiative
2004:  White Paper on the Report of the Education 
Reform  Committee.  Proposes  to  expand  basic 
education  to  11  years  (2  years  KG,  6  primary,  3 
JSS); reform JSS etc.
2004:  Education  Sector  Technical  Advisory 
Committee  (ESTAC)  set  up  by  the  education 
ministry to oversee the ESP process and coordinate 
development partner assistance.
2006-2009: Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy 
(GPRS II).
2000-2005:  Japan  (JICA)  Science,  Technology  and 
Mathematics in Basic Education (STM) project -  to support 
fCUBE mainly in teacher training (US $6.49 million).
2000-02:  Japan  grants  for  school  block  construction  (US$ 
0.5 million) – project funded 80 classroom blocks. 
Since  2003:  Multi  Donor  Budgetary  Support  (MDBS); 
Denmark, Germany, Holland, UK, Canada, Switzerland and 
France (since 2005), alongside the World Bank, the IMF, the 
AfDB  and  the  EU  providing  some  of  their  assistance  as 
direct budgetary support (in the form of  Poverty Reduction 
Budget  Support)  to finance Government (GPRS) priorities, 
including  in  education.  Multi-Donor  Budget  Support 
(MDBS) is designed to support the speedy implementation of 
the GPRS, particularly in the three relatively disadvantaged 
regions in the north of the country.
2003: DFID  technical assistance personnel involved in the 
design and preparation of the ESP.
2004-2009: World Bank Education Sector Project (EdSeP). 
Includes a component to build capacity at all  levels of the 
educational system between and within organizations in the 
sector; improve the quality of leadership and management in 
the sector; another component is a pilot programme scheme 
which applies to basic education.
2004: USAID Education Quality for All – EQUALL Project.
2006:  Millennium  Challenge  Account  (MCA)  –  some 
support  to  construction  and  rehabilitation  of  educational 
facilities, especially at the KG and primary levels. 
2006-2009:  DFID  Support  to  Education  Strategic  Plan 
(SESP). Focus on basic education.  The goal of SESP is the 
achievement of the MDGs relating to education.  The SESP 
forms  part  of  DFID’s  long  term  commitment  to  provide 
UK£10m  to  educational  development  in  Ghana  each  year 
until  2015,  subject  to  satisfactory  performance  on  agreed 
sector  outputs and Millennium Development Goals  targets. 
80%  of  total  DFID  support  now  through  the  MDBS 
mechanism  through  DFID’s  Poverty  Reduction  Budget 
Support (PRBS).
2007:  Ghana  Joint  Assistance  Strategy  (G-JAS)  aligns 
majority  of  donors  with  GPRS  II  priorities,  including  in 
education. 
Source: authors and Buchert, 2002; Casely-Hayford, 2000; Palmer, 2005c; World Bank, 
2004a
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Annex  2:   Government  Initiatives  and  External  Agency  Support  to  Skills 
Development
Government initiatives related to Skills Development External agency and development partner initiatives 
in support of Skills Development41
1957 White Paper on a National Workers Brigade
1960 Education Act (87) - making primary schooling 
compulsory and free with effect from September 
1961 - although it does not define until what age 
the  child  should  attend  school.  Established 
private  institutions  (many  of  which  offer 
TVET).
1966 Kwapong  Educational  Review  Committee – 
introduced continuation schools 
1970 The  National  Vocational  Training  Institute 
(NVTI)  Act  (351)  -  responsible  for  the 
nationwide  coordination  of  all  aspects  of 
vocational training including apprenticeship - in 
both formal and informal sectors.
1972 Dzobo  Educational  Reform  Committee – 
experimental pre-vocational courses at the junior 
secondary level.
1981 National  Board  for  Small-Scale  Industries 
(NBSSI)  Act  (434)  –  set  up  to  promote  and 
develop the small-scale industrial sector. NBSSI 
contains a training element.
1986 Evans Anfom Committee –  re-introduced  the 
pre-vocational  classes  at  the  junior  secondary 
level. 
1986  Integrated Community Centres for Employable 
Skills (ICCES)  established  with  UNICEF 
support.  Initially  12  pilot  centres,  the  ICCES 
network expanded to 59 by 2007.
1987 Ghana  Regional  Appropriate  Technology 
Industrial  Service (GRATIS) -  set  up by the 
Government  to  promote  small-scale 
industrialisation  and  provide  employment 
opportunities, improve incomes and enhance the 
development  of  Ghana.  GRATIS  provides 
training  and  technical  assistance  to  artisans 
through  ten  Intermediate  Technology  Transfer 
Units. GRATIS experiences a high rate of labour 
turnover  in  the  project  as  a  result  of  low 
remuneration  and  motivation  for  the  workers. 
There  is  high  level  of  worker  dissatisfaction 
with poor conditions of employment.
1960s   Soviet  Union  support  to  technical  institutes 
during  the  1960s.  When  Nkrumah  was 
overthrown  in  1966,  Soviet  technicians  were 
expelled  and  USSR-supplied  equipment  and 
curricula  in Ghana’s  public  TVET sector  was 
not maintained or upgraded.  
1960s  onwards  CIDA  support to  technical  training 
institutes  -  to  develop  a  secondary  focus  on 
providing  short  skills-upgrading  courses  for 
those already working in SMEs
1977-2005 German support to technical  institutes (e.g. 
Takoradi Technical Institute and Biriwa NVTI); 
also  supported  training  of  instructors  in 
Germany  and  provided  vehicles  and  other 
logistical support to NVTIs.
1987   UNICEF - support to establishing 12 pilot ICCES 
centres (1987-92).
1987 NGO  and  other  small-scale  ad  hoc  support  to 
ICCES,  1987-2007  (e.g.  NGOs  providing 
volunteers;  NGO  support  for  micro-projects 
like  classroom  construction).  Also  some 
development partner embassy support to micro-
projects  like  classroom  or  workshop 
construction (e.g. Japan’s Grant Assistance for 
Grassroots Projects).
41 These  are  not  the  only  external  agency  and  development  partner  initiatives  concerned  with  skills 
development, but the main ones. For example, there has also been assistance to the skills development 
sector over this period from: a large number of NGOs (e.g. the Catholic Don Bosco support to 2 VTIs); 
from development  partner  embassy support  to  skills  projects;  and  from foreign  volunteers  (e.g.  VSO, 
JOCV) assigned to VTIs.
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1990s Informal  sector  associations  supported  by 
Rawlings’  Provisional  National  Defence 
Council.  Ostensibly  to  act  as  intermediaries 
between  member  enterprises  and  the 
government or other supporting bodies, though 
the establishment of many well-known ISAs had 
more  to  do  with  politics  than  self-help.  ISAs 
often  involved  with  monitoring  training 
activities  and  providing  certification  to 
members. 
1990 National  Coordinating  Committee  on 
Technical  and  Vocational  Education  and 
Training (NACVET) was set up to coordinate a 
national skills development system.
1993:  District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF) set 
up as a statutory budget item (paid for from 5% 
of central government revenue) of which 20% is 
recommended  for  education  infrastructure;  a 
further 20% is allocated to a poverty alleviation 
fund  which  can  be  used  to  fund  skills 
development initiatives in the district (e.g. in the 
case  of  many  Assemblies  in  Ashanti  Region 
funding infrastructure for ICCES)  
1995 National  development  agenda-Vision  2020 - 
outlines  training  policy  objectives  in  terms  of 
strengthening  and  expanding  training  facilities 
through;  i)  improving  and  expanding  the 
infrastructure  for  training;  ii)  increasing 
opportunities for technical  and vocational level 
training, and iii) strengthening linkages between 
the training sector and industry. 
1998 Children’s  Act (560).  Part  V,  sub-part  II  on 
apprenticeship in the informal sector – specifies 
minimum  age  of  traditional  apprenticeship 
should be 15 years or after completion of basic 
education  (basic  education  being  officially 
compulsory)  (section  98).  Sets  out  masters’ 
responsibilities  towards  their  apprentices 
regarding  training  (section  99),  the 
apprenticeship  agreement  (section  100)  duties 
(section  101)  and  release  (section  102)  of 
apprentice.
1995 Vocational  Skills and Informal  Sector support 
project (VSP) (World Bank funded – US$ 5.8 
million,  1995-2001)  -  focused  on  skills 
upgrading  for  10,000  master-craftsmen  and 
15,000  traditional  apprentices.  The  VSP  did 
have some success in improving the outcomes 
of  graduates,  but  experienced  a  number  of 
problems and  did  not  lead  to  any  significant 
impact on the wider informal sector.
1995 Rural  Enterprise Project  (REP) (IFAD funded 
1995  -  ongoing)  -  aims  to  increase  rural 
production, employment and income in order to 
alleviate poverty through the increased output 
of  small  off-farm  enterprises.  This  is  being 
accomplished  by:  facilitating  access  to  new 
technology  and  business  advice;  promoting 
easier  access  to  financial  services;  improving 
the  efficiency  of  existing  small  rural 
enterprises,  supporting  the  creation  of  new 
enterprises,  and  removing  communication 
constraints through feeder road rehabilitation. 
1996      DFID NVTI Centres Support Project (1996-98) 
-  to  improve  capacity  of  NVTIs  to  deliver 
quality  training.  Also  supplied  vehicles  and 
equipment. 
1999   JICA US$ 2.7 million study on the ‘Development 
of  Technical  Education  Plan  for  Ghana’ 
(1999-2001)  to  develop  a  ‘Master  Plan  to 
Strengthen  Technical  Education’  (the  basic 
concept of this master plan was adopted in the 
2003 ESP – see below).
1999    Netherlands - support to 20 VOTEC Resource 
Centres in some TVET institutions (1999-03)
2001       New Patriotic  Party takes office;  renewed 2000      CIDA support to GRATIS (2000-09)
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emphasis on skills development begins. 
2001     GoG  undertakes  unemployment  registration 
exercise (Sept – Dec); exercise revealed demand 
for skills development. 
2002  Presidential Committee of Review of Education 
Reforms; comments that the skills development 
sector  has  been  the  object  of  ‘almost  total 
neglect’.
2002  GoG  incorporates  the  salaries  of  most  ICCES 
instructors  into  the  national  budget,  removing 
responsibility from the communities and centres 
for staff remuneration.
2003 Education Strategic Plan (ESP) (2003-15). One of 
the four main focus points of the ESP includes 
TVET (‘Science, Technology and TVET’).
2003  Skills  Training  and  Entrepreneurship 
Programme  (STEP) launched, financed by the 
HIPC fund (US$1.1 million was allocated to in 
2003 to implement STEP); phase 1 (February–
July 2003), phase 2 (November 2003–2005).
2003     Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS I) 
(2003-05);  short  section  on  ‘Skills  and 
entrepreneurial development for the youth’.
2004   White Paper on the Report of the Education 
Reform  Committee.  Regarding  skills,  it 
acknowledges  the  failure  of  the  JSS 
vocationalisation  policy;  proposes  a 
diversification  of  the  senior  secondary  level; 
promotes  a  more  formalised  apprenticeship 
training programmes with government assuming 
‘full  responsibility’  for  the  first  year  of  the 
programme.
2004      TVET Policy Framework Document; the first 
comprehensive national TVET policy. Proposes 
to dramatically expand the formal TVET sector 
and  to  include  the  informal  system  as  part  of 
public provision. Calls for the establishment of a 
Council for TVET (COTVET).
2006  Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS 
II) (2006-09);  section  on  ‘Training  and  Skills 
Development’ which sets out a series of priority 
areas:  (i)  provide  skills  and  entrepreneurial 
training  in  a  gender  responsive  and  equitable 
manner; (ii) promote dialogue between industry 
and  skills/professional  training  institutions  to 
produce skilled labour required by industry; (iii) 
strengthen and support human resource training 
institutions;  (iv)  promote  apprenticeship 
training;  (v)  promote  the  adoption  of  the 
National  Youth  Policy  and  enactment  of  the 
Disability Bill.
2006      COTVET established (July) to coordinate and 
oversee all  aspects  of TVET, across  ministries 
and the broad spectrum of formal, informal and 
non-formal education and training.
2001   Ghana  becomes  a  HIPC  member  (April)  and 
receives partial debt forgiveness; money saved 
by the government on debt servicing has gone 
into social and economic development projects 
around  the  country,  including  in  skills 
development  (e.g.  the  STEP  in  2003  –  see 
below). 
2001  JICA  support  to  development  of  TVET  policy 
framework  and  implementation  of  the 
competency  based  training  approach  (2001  – 
ongoing).
2003-06  DP funding to  TVET under  the MoESS was 
only 0.2% in 2003, 2.3% in 2004, 0.9% in 2005 
and 1% in 2006.
2004  ILO–IPEC  Multi-bilateral  Programme  of 
Technical  Cooperation  on  skills  training 
strategies to combat child labour in the urban 
informal  sector  (funded  through  the 
government  of  Canada,  2004  –  ongoing); 
reforming traditional  apprenticeship is  part  of 
the strategy of this project.
2005    Announcement  that  Ghana’s  multilateral  debt 
was  to  be  written  off  by  the  International 
Community.
2005   EU  support  to  a  small  vocational  training 
programme in the north.
2005   CIDA support to the ‘Toolkit for Change’ project 
(2005-10).
2005   JICA Technical  Vocational  Education  and 
Training  Support  (TVETS)  Project 
(2005-2009);  a  pilot  project  on  competency 
based training. 
2006     Netherlands support to the new Ghana Industrial 
Skills Development Centre at Tema (a public – 
private partnership).  
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Annex 3: Ghana Partnership Strategy Results Matrix for Education and Skills Development (GoG/DP, 2006: 8-10)
GPRS Goals Expected Outcomes Indicators to Track Government Strategies and Actions  Development Partner Contributions
  Implementation towards   
  Outcomes   
EDUCATION     
     
Access Enrolment, survival and Gross Enrolment Ratio • Expand preschool access in all basic schools to ensure smooth MDBS/PRSC
 completion rates increased (GER) in Primary, Jr. transition from home to school
• To increase access, completion and quality in 
basic
 in kindergarten, primary, Secondary School (JSS), • Increase school enrolment
education, support for extending capitation grants 
to all
 JSS, SSS and TVET Sr. Secondary School • Accelerate the rehabilitation /development of basic school
pupils attending public primary and junior 
secondary
 Rates: (SSS), Net Enrolment infrastructure (with water and toilet facilities)
schools and for increasing GPER in the three most 
deprived
 GER            2006 - 2009 Ratio (NER) and • Remove barriers to primary school entry and retention regions. Bridge gender gap in access.
 KG            64.5% - 76.3% Technical and Vocational • Shift burden of payments for education services away from poorer
• Reducing teacher vacancies in deprived districts; 
help
 Primary    90.3% - 99% Education and Training students at lower levels (especially the girl-child)
expand teacher retention schemes and implement 
District
 JSS           76.3% - 86.6% (TVET) • Ensure that buildings and other physical infrastructure in schools
sponsorship scheme for teacher trainees based on 
teacher
 SSS           28.3% - 30.9%  
and training institutions are made accessible to the physically 
disabled needs assessment
 TVET      20,694 - 22,764 Survival rate: P6; JSS 3; • Adopt targeted programmes to improve access in underserved areas
• To improve efficiency and equity of financing 
education
  SSS3 • Expand Non Formal Education in partnership with community
with attention to greater poverty impact, continue 
to help
 Survival       2006 - 2009  groups, NGOs and private providers deliver increased resources to 53 deprived districts
 KG             100% Passage of Education Bill • Facilitate the implementation of capitation grants in all public  
 Primary     84.4% - 92.6% and TVET Bill primary schools ONGOING FINANCING
 JSS              88% - 92%  • Enact laws that support implementation of FCUBE
• Development Partners provide coordinated 
support for all
   • Ensure relevance and coverage of vocational and technical training
six goals in the education sector, either through 
specific
 Completion   2006 - 2009  • Diversify vocational and technical training to link with industry
projects (AfDB, BADEA, France, Germany GTZ, 
JICA,
 Primary 6       81.9%  • Support private-public partnership in the management of vocational UNESCO, UNICEF, USAID,WFP, IFC) or sector
 JSS 3             77.9%  and technical schools
programmes (DfID, EC, Netherlands, World Bank) 
or
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   • Promote entrepreneurship among the youth general budget support (MDBS group)
   • Enhance Infrastructural development in universities and  
   polytechnics  
   • Develop a national policy on Distance Education  
GPRS Goals Expected Outcomes Indicators to Track Government Strategies and Actions  Development Partner Contributions
  Implementation towards   
  Outcomes   
Gender Gender parity in school GPI: National, Deprived
• Provide incentive schemes to increase girls enrolment, retention 
and  
 enrolment Districts at KG, Primary, completion particularly in deprived areas  
 GPI JSS, SSS, TVET • Sensitize parents and communities about the importance of girls’  
 National      2006 - 2009  education  
 KG               1.0  • Implement School Feeding programme  
 Primary       1.0  • Implement Girls Scholarship Schemes  
 JSS              0.93 - 1.0   
 Deprived District 2006 - 2009   
 KG                        1.0   
 Primary                1.0   
 JSS                      0.93 - 1.0   
 Participation 2006 - 2009   
 SSS               44.1% - 46%   
 TVET            18.3% - 31.4%    
Quality Improved quality of education Proportion of students • Introduce programme of national education quality assessment  
 National Education passing National • Ensure teacher development, deployment and supervision  
 Assessment Text Score Assessment Exams • Provide incentives to teachers in deprived areas  
                   2006 - 2009 (BECE; SSCE) with • Improve the teaching of Science, technology and mathematics in all  
                 64.6% - 66.4% good grades basic schools  
 % of Trained Teachers Percentage of trained • Develop and promote the use of ICT in all schools and institutions  
 National    2006 - 2009 teachers in basic schools: of higher learning  
 KG           37.4% - 61.5% National, Deprived  
 Primary   75.5% - 85% Districts, Primary, JSS  
 JSS          85.2% - 90.4%   
 Deprived District   
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                       2006 - 2009   
 KG              24.9% - 58.4%   
 Primary      60.2% - 81.1%   
JSS             81.5% - 89.5%
GPRS Goals Expected Outcomes Indicators to Track Government Strategies and Actions  Development Partner Contributions
  Implementation towards   
  Outcomes   
Education Improved systems and % of GoG non salary • Strengthen and improve educational planning and management  
management efficiency in education recurrent expenditure • Stress and support private sector participation in education  
 service delivery National • Strengthen institutional arrangement for the role of CBO, CSO in  
  and Deprived Districts advocacy, monitoring and evaluation  
   • Strengthen monitoring and evaluation framework and reporting  
   channels as a key priority  
   • Construction and rehabilitation of basic school classrooms  
Science, Enhance teaching and Scores in Third • Provide incentive schemes to attract more teachers into the teaching  
Mathematics learning of Science and International Mathematics of science and technical education  
and Technical Mathematics and Science Study (TIMS) • Support science and research institutions  
Education  No. of Students reading • Provide incentives to attract science students  
  science, mathematics and • Increase funding for research and technology development  
  technical programmes at • Support private sector initiatives in science education  
  the second cycle and • 15 existing Teacher Training Colleges converted to specialise in the  
  tertiary levels teaching of Mathematics and Science by 2009  
  No. of TVET institutions • Provide incentives and support to private technical and vocational  
   institutions  
Behavioral Issues of population, Report on curricula • Promote the study of and integrate in the curricula of schools and  
Health gender, health,  
institutions of higher learning attitudinal change regarding 
population,  
 HIV/AIDS, fire safety,  good health, gender, fire safety, road safety, civic responsibility and  
 road safety, civic  environment concerns  
 responsibility and  • Identify and promote programmes that will assist in the prevention  
 environment mainstreamed  and management of HIV/AIDS  
 in the curricula of schools   
 and institutions of higher   
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 learning    
GPRS Goals Expected Outcomes Indicators to Track Government Strategies and Actions  Development Partner Contributions
  Implementation towards   
  Outcomes   
SKILLS AND MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT   
 Comprehensive HRD HRD policy and planning
• Develop a comprehensive manpower development policy 
framework  
 policy and planning framework document that takes into account specific needs of men and women, persons  
 framework  
living with disability, HIV/AIDS, public and private sector at all 
levels  
  Functional HRD Unit • Establish a National HR Unit  
 Improved training, Unemployment Rate • Develop HRD Plan at all levels  
 deployment and retention  • Provide adequate incentives to retain skilled labour  
 of key HR  • Provide adequate resources for human resource capacity  
   development  
 Improved match between Regular reports on Labour • Undertake Human Resource capacity survey
Labour Market Information System -- German 
Trust Fund
 labour market needs and Market Information System (WB)
 skills available    
 Increased levels of Proportion of unemployed
• Train unemployed youth in competency based demand driven 
skills, PLANNED FINANCING
 productivity youth benefiting from including the Youth Mass Employment Programme • e-Ghana – WB
  skills/apprenticeship and
• Promote and establish production units in vocational training 
centres  
  entrepreneurial training • Set standards for vocational training and entrepreneurial ANALYTICAL AND OTHER SUPPORT
   development • Youth & Employment Study – WB
   • Intensify co-operative education and its practice in collaboration • Pilot Competency Based Training Project (JICA)
   with stakeholders  
   • Promote the training of people with disability  
   • Implement National Apprenticeship Programme  
 Improved collaboration No. of people receiving on • Establish collaboration between human resource capacity  
 between industries the job training development institutions and industry  
 Improved quality of Level of employer • Assist HR training institutions to develop new syllabi/curricula to  
 training satisfaction with quality of meet requirements of industry  
  trainees   
69
Annex 4: DP Harmonisation and selectivity in support of education and skills development objectives in the GPRS II
GPRS II 2006 Planned Country More harmonized working Greater selectivity
Pillar/Objective Financing Financing 2007- Analytic/
2010 Advisory
work
Pillar 2: Human Development
Obj 1: Education Coordinated DP Coordinated DP WB, DFID, DPs providing coordinated support to Education EC & RNE to delegate advisory
support through support through Japan, WFP, Sector Strategy through active working group. role to DFID.
(i) specific (i) specific UNICEF,
projects - projects - UNESCO DPs supporting sector programmes using EC to move funds to MDBS.
AfDB, BADEA, USAID, Japan government systems for channelling funds.
France, Spain, UNESCO, MCA, Joint GoG/DP DFID to manage RNE funds to
Germany, IFC, AfDB, UNICEF, work planned the sector.
Japan, WFP, France for 2007.
UNESCO,
UNICEF, USAID
(ii) sector (ii) sector
programmes - programmes -
DFID, EC, WB, WB, DFID,
EFA/FTI RNE (silent with
DFID), EFA/FTI
Obj 2: Skills development WB, Japan WB, Japan WB
Source: G-JAS, 2007: 42-43
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Annex 5: Donor support for education, 1987-2002, in millions of US$
Total 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
HERP 3.47 0.62 0.68 0.93 0.62 0.62
EdSAC I 38.32 9.36 3.16 4.67 9.90 10.21 1.02
EdSAC II 53.20 13.30 10.60 8.70 4.60 16.00
CSSC 15.18 5.41 4.31 3.26 2.20
Literacy and functional skills 10.63 0.00 2.02 1.39 2.51 2.64 2.07
Tertiary education project 44.80 3.20 0.60 8.20 12.20 15.40 4.20 1.00
PSD 53.20 2.50 9.20 20.30 15.20 5.90 0.10
Vocational Skills 5.80 0.80 0.80 0.40 1.50 1.30 1.00
BESIP 1.28 2.57 1.28 17.30 12.37 10.70
National functional literacy 1.00 4.00
Total World Bank 271.7 9.4 3.2 4.7 9.9 23.5 17.0 18.2 12.4 38.1 35.9 34.7 13.1 3.9 18.6 14.4 14.7
Total Bilaterial (DAC) 317.3 1.2 0.9 6.9 12.3 18.6 19.2 5.0 3.3 13.4 24.4 56.2 104.4 37.3 14.2 n.a n.a
Total Donor 589 10.6 4.1 11.6 22.2 42.1 36.2 23.2 15.7 51.5 60.3 90.9 117.5 41.2 32.8 14.4 14.7
Bank share of total (%) 46.1   88.7  78.0  40.5  44.6  55.8  47.0  78.4  79.0  74.0  59.5  38.2  11.1  9.5    56.7      100.0    100.0    
Non-Bank share of total (%) 53.9   11.3  22.0  59.5  55.4  44.2  53.0  21.6  21.0  26.0  40.5  61.8  88.9  90.5  43.3      
Source:  World Bank  2004. 11.32 21.95 59.48 55.41 44.18 53.04 21.55 21.02 26.02 40.46 61.83 88.85 90.53 43.29    
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